THE COMPLIANCE PROCESS
VERONICA ROOT*
Even as regulators and prosecutors proclaim the importance of effective compliance
programs, failures persist. Organizations fail to ensure that they and their agents
comply with legal and regulatory requirements, industry practices, and their own
internal policies and norms. From the companies that provide our news, to the
financial institutions that serve as our bankers, to the corporations that make our
cars, compliance programs fail to prevent misconduct each and every day. The
causes of these compliance failures are multifaceted and include general
enforcement deficiencies, difficulties associated with overseeing compliance
programs within complex organizations, and failures to establish a culture of
compliance throughout the organizational structure. In short, creating an effective
compliance program is an inherently difficult task.
And yet, it may be that organizations can improve compliance within their
organizations by rethinking the way they approach the compliance challenge. This
Article—drawing on insights from cognitive psychology, behavioral economics, and
behavioral ethics—sets forth a new method of evaluating compliance failures that
focuses on the compliance process, which has the distinct, albeit interrelated, stages
of prevention, detection, investigation, and remediation. The Article argues that
utilizing a process frame will assist industry leaders, regulators, and policymakers
in conducting more effective root-cause analyses of compliance failures, which will
lead to the creation, implementation, and better evaluation of compliance programs.
Delineating clear boundaries for the stages within the compliance process is
difficult, but getting these distinctions right is essential when confronted with
significant or complex compliance failures, particularly when an organization lacks
a robust commitment to compliance. Additionally, the process frame can be utilized
across regulatory areas and corporate forms, which serves to cement compliance as
its own proper field worthy of further inquiry and study. By focusing on “The
Compliance Process,” organizations, policymakers, and scholars will improve the
tools available for them to assist in the creation and implementation of effective
compliance programs.
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INTRODUCTION
Regulators, prosecutors, corporations, and their members dedicate a great deal of
time and resources to implement the ever-elusive “effective compliance program.”
Compliance refers to a firm’s effort to ensure that it and its agents adhere to legal
and regulatory requirements, industry practice, and the firm’s own internal policies
and norms. Organizations from all over the world, out of fear of sanction, harm,
retribution, or ridicule, initiate programs aimed at making certain that their
employees and members maintain compliance with external and internal norms and
requirements. Yet every year seems to bring another set of significant scandals within
organizations.
From fake accounts to faulty ignition switches to bribed foreign officials, serious
and pervasive corporate misdeeds continue to occur, and these misdeeds are very
often labeled “a compliance failure.”1 When compliance failures occur, organizations
inevitably end up focusing on how the compliance program itself failed, so that the
firm can implement a compliance program that will ensure that future, similar
misconduct does not occur. For the most complex of compliance failures, however,
inquiries framed from the perspective of how a compliance program failed can be
relatively broad and potentially unwieldy. As this Article demonstrates, however, an
organization’s compliance program consists of four distinct stages within a
compliance process: prevention, detection, investigation, and remediation. When
compliance failures are assessed through a process frame, greater clarity regarding
the nature of the compliance program’s failure may be discerned.
For example, starting in July 2016, a sexual harassment scandal emerged at Fox
News, which is owned by a subsidiary of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.,2 leading
to the dismissal of Roger Ailes, the former chief executive officer of Fox News,
among others.3 The public scandal began when a former Fox News anchor, Gretchen

1. The amorphous “compliance failure” distinction covers a huge swath of behavior
across dozens of industries in public and private firms, which is perhaps unsurprising when
one considers that a diverse set of firms will be subject to different legal and regulatory
requirements.
2. Fox News provides reporting on current and political events occurring within the
United States and across the world. It is owned by Fox Entertainment Group, which is a
subsidiary of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. Twenty-First Century Fox has a “portfolio[] of
cable, broadcast, film, pay TV and satellite assets spanning six continents across the globe.”
It “[r]each[es] more than 1.8 billion subscribers in approximately 50 local languages every
day.” Investor Relations, 21ST CENTURY FOX, https://www.21cf.com/investor-relations
[https://perma.cc/SZP4-C4DH].
3. Jonathan Stempel, 21st Century Fox in $90 Million Settlement Tied to Sexual
Harassment Scandal, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2017, 6:02 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us
-fox-settlement/21st-century-fox-in-90-million-settlement-tied-to-sexual-harassment-scandal
-idUSKBN1DK2NI [https://perma.cc/E3MB-6MTT].
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Carlson, filed a lawsuit accusing Roger Ailes of engaging in sexual harassment.4
Prior to being dismissed from Fox News and filing suit, Carlson recorded all private
meetings between herself and Ailes for over a year and a half.5 The recordings
included remarks from Ailes such as, “I think you and I should have had a sexual
relationship a long time ago, and then you’d be good and better and I’d be good and
better.”6 Upon Carlson filing suit, several other women alleged similar accounts
detailing experiences of sexual harassment from Ailes.7 Ailes departed as chief
executive officer of Fox News about two weeks after Carlson filed suit,8 but her
complaint triggered a reckoning within the organization.9
Upon reviewing the events at Fox News, one natural conclusion is that the
organization failed to create, implement, and execute an effective compliance
program that would properly address and respond to sexual harassment in the
workplace. That conclusion, given the depth and breadth of the alleged misconduct
at Fox News, provides an insufficient basis for fully assessing the root causes of the
compliance failure. But when a process frame is employed, additional details appear
explaining why the sexual harassment program failed.
First, it appears Fox News failed to engage in activities likely to effectively
prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. For example, Fox News,10 like many
organizations,11 relied on sexual harassment training to prevent misconduct in its
workplace. Organizations rely on training to prevent misconduct, in part, because of
two Supreme Court rulings from the late 1990s.12 However, in 2015 “the EEOC
established a task force to investigate workplace harassment and concluded that
‘much of the training done over the last 30 years has not worked as a prevention

4. Tom Huddleston Jr., Roger Ailes Resigns: A Timeline of His Downfall, FORTUNE (July
21, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/21/roger-ailes-resigned-scandal-timeline [https://perma
.cc/75GK-JHFA].
5. Michael M. Grynbaum & John Koblin, Fox Settles with Gretchen Carlson over Roger
Ailes Sex Harassment Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes
.com/2016/09/07/business/media/fox-news-roger-ailes-gretchen-carlson-sexual-harassment
-lawsuit-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/2G33-WBRE].
6. Id.
7. Huddleston, supra note 4.
8. Id.
9. Emily Steel & Michael S. Schmidt, Bill O’Reilly Settled New Harassment Claim,
Then Fox Renewed His Contract, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/10/21/business/media/bill-oreilly-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/FR6L
-YCBY].
10. Non-Monetary Relief at 1–2, 14, City of Monroe Emps.’ Ret. Sys. ex rel. TwentyFirst Century Fox, Inc. v. Murdoch, No. 2017-0833-AGB (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2017) (As part
of this agreement, Fox News agreed to “continue to conduct ‘live’ harassment and
discrimination training for every employee.”).
11. Claire Suddath, Why Can’t We Stop Sexual Harassment at Work?, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-sexual
-harassment-policy [https://perma.cc/8UVV-RPSQ].
12. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (creating a two-part
affirmative defense allowing employers to avoid sex discrimination liability when following
best practices); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (adopting the same
two-part affirmative defense).
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tool.’”13 Thus, while Fox News was likely complying with industry standards and
best practices when utilizing sexual harassment training, the training activities it
engaged in may not have been likely to prevent workplace sexual harassment. And
Fox News failed to respond to new information and guidance that revealed the pitfalls
and drawbacks of relying primarily on training to prevent sexual harassment in the
workplace.14 Additionally, Fox News allegedly developed a culture where men were
valued for making robust commentary while women were valued for their physical
attributes.15 It does not appear that Fox News engaged in activity to prevent the
commodification of women within its workforce.
Second, Fox News failed to detect sexual harassment within its organization.
Sexual harassment, like many employment law issues, puts the onus on the victim to
self-report misconduct. At Fox News, an alleged culture existed where women were
afraid of reporting harassment. For instance, Megyn Kelly, a former Fox News
television journalist who also alleged sexual harassment by Ailes, stated she believes
the men at the center of the sexual harassment scandals “actively worked to suppress
them and scare the other women.”16 Additionally, the detection mechanisms
established at Fox News would have allowed Ailes to effectively stifle any

13. Suddath, supra note 11. One reason posited for why training is an ineffective
prevention tool is “that both managers and workers regard it as a pro forma exercise aimed at
limiting the employer’s legal liability.” Yuki Noguchi, Trainers, Lawyers Say Sexual
Harassment Training Fails, NPR (Nov. 8, 2017, 4:30 PM), https://www.npr.org
/2017/11/08/562641787/trainers-lawyers-say-sexual-harassment-training-fails [https://perma
.cc/7H2N-SVYU]. Focusing on the legality of the harassment is a problem because “the letter
of the law prohibits ‘severe or pervasive’ harassment when, in fact . . . there are plenty of
examples that might not meet that standard but clearly should not be tolerated in the
workplace.” Id. Further, most training courses are online, which do not appropriately engage
employees. Id.
At best, research has found, [online sexual harassment] training succeeds in
teaching people basic information, like the definition of harassment and how to
report violations. At worst, it can make them uncomfortable, prompting
defensive jokes, or reinforce gender stereotypes, potentially making harassment
worse. Either way, it usually fails to address the root problem: preventing sexual
harassment from happening in the first place.
Claire Cain Miller, Sexual Harassment Training Doesn’t Work. But Some Things Do., N.Y.
TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/upshot/sexual
-harassment-workplace-prevention-effective.html [https://perma.cc/3PYY-BHHE].
14. While the EEOC still emphasizes that training is better than no training, it wants
companies to “supplement training with initiatives that emphasize broader topics such as
civility and respect.” Suddath, supra note 11.
15. Fox News developed a reputation for “[b]lustery male commentators and women, just
as qualified, who were showcased for their looks with revealing clothes and camera shots.”
Mike Snider, Sexual Harassment at Fox News: Murdochs Overhaul Culture with Eyes on Sky,
KITSAP SUN (July 17, 2017, 2:49 PM), https://www.kitsapsun.com/story/money/business
/2017/07/17/sexual-harassment-fox-news-murdochs-overhaul-culture-eyes-sky/460303001
[https://perma.cc/6YWT-MP8B].
16. Dominic Patten, Megyn Kelly on Why Harvey Weinstein’s “Done”, Sexual
Harassment Solutions, Doubling Down & Rising Ratings, DEADLINE (Nov. 9, 2017, 7:45 AM),
http://deadline.com/2017/11/megyn-kelly-sexual-harassment-interview-harvey-weinstein
-fox-news-roger-ailes-experiences-1202203810 [https://perma.cc/C9LB-H9CE].
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investigations because human resources, the department that would receive sexual
harassment claims, reported to Roger Ailes.17
Third, Fox News initially failed to investigate sexual harassment when alerted to
potential misconduct. For example, a biography of Ailes published in 2014 included
multiple stories of women, the majority of which remained unnamed, who reported
being sexually harassed by Ailes.18 It does not appear that this information was acted
upon by appropriate channels within Fox News or Twenty-First Century Fox. After
becoming aware of Carlson’s allegations, Twenty-First Century Fox did, however,
retain an external law firm to initiate an internal investigation into the alleged sexual
harassment by Ailes. Based on the findings of the internal review, at least six
additional women claimed Ailes behaved inappropriately toward them.19
Fourth, Fox News struggled to remediate and properly address sexual harassment
claims. For example, after Ailes was dismissed from Fox News, allegations were
brought against then Fox News megastar Bill O’Reilly.20 These were not the first
allegations brought against O’Reilly, as settlements were entered into for claims
alleging sexual harassment by O’Reilly in 2002, 2004, 2011, as well as two in 2016.21
Twenty-First Century Fox allowed O’Reilly to designate the latter allegations as a
“personal matter” and permitted him to settle the sixth claim in January 2017 without
disclosing the parameters of the settlement to Twenty-First Century Fox.22 The
settlement amount, which was subsequently disclosed to the public, was $32
million.23 Despite this history and awareness of conduct that resulted in repeated
settlements for alleged sexual harassment, in February 2017, Twenty-First Century
Fox granted O’Reilly a four-year contract extension that paid him $25 million a
year.24 Additionally, upon learning of Ailes and O’Reilly’s alleged repeat
misconduct, instead of sending a strong signal regarding the need to conduct an
extensive overhaul of its policies and procedures regarding sexual harassment, then
executive cochairman of Twenty-First Century Fox, Rupert Murdoch, stated in
December 2017 that the Fox News sexual harassment scandal was “[a]ll nonsense,
there was a problem with our chief executive, sort of, over the years, isolated
incidents.” 25 Yet, more than two dozen women came forward with sexual harassment

17. Id. During an interview after Ailes’s alleged misconduct became public, Kelly argued
that human resources, where employees report discrimination and harassment, should not
report to the chief executive officer to avoid conflicts of interest. Id.
18. Callum Borchers, Book: Roger Ailes Has Been Soliciting Sex from Female Journalists
Since the 1980s, WASH. POST: THE FIX (July 6, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/07/06/book-roger-ailes-has-been-soliciting-sex-from-female
-journalists-since-the-1980s/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.033f10a4519e
[https://perma.cc
/G8NP-S8NY].
19. Jim Rutenberg, Ben Protess & Emily Steel, Internal Inquiry Sealed the Fate of Roger
Ailes at Fox, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/business
/media/as-an-internal-inquiry-sinks-ailes-questions-about-fox-newss-fate.html?mtrref=www
.google.com [https://perma.cc/DN3L-BPQR].
20. Steel & Schmidt, supra note 9.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Erik Wemple, Rupert Murdoch Expertly Returns the Sexual Harassment Spotlight to
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allegations against Roger Ailes, the former chief executive officer, in addition to
complaints against other employees.26 Despite Murdoch’s statements, Twenty-First
Century Fox has engaged in some potentially robust remediation efforts, as
evidenced by the fact that it (i) dismissed Ailes and O’Reilly,27 (ii) entered into
multiple settlements in summer 2016 regarding Ailes’s alleged misconduct,28 (iii)
agreed to implement governance and compliance enhancements aimed at preventing
sexual harassment,29 and (iv) expressed its commitment to preventing sexual
harassment, racial discrimination, and retaliation in its Statement of Corporate
Governance.30
As demonstrated by this description, labeling the challenges faced by TwentyFirst Century Fox and Fox News as a failure in creating and maintaining an effective
sexual harassment compliance program does not prompt one to see the depth and
breadth of the potential deficiencies present. The root causes of the compliance
failures at Twenty-First Century Fox and Fox News appear multifaceted. At a
minimum, the causes may include (i) poor guidance and policy from Supreme Court
jurisprudence, (ii) a need to adjust reporting lines within the firms, (iii) a more robust
and responsive investigative process when confronted with allegations of sexual
harassment, and (iv) improved leadership responses to allegations of sexual
harassment and possible dysfunctional cultural realities within the firms. These
multilayered, contributing causes become more apparent when one confronts the
corporate misconduct using a process frame.
While the emerging field of compliance is perceived by many as a narrow
component of general corporate governance efforts,31 the sheer breadth and diversity
of issues compliance programs must confront makes implementing effective
compliance programs an intensely challenging endeavor.32 Today’s organizations are
responsible for ensuring proper compliance in many different areas. Whether it is
General Motors’s failure to properly address a faulty ignition switch or Wells Fargo’s
decision to ignore fraudulently opened accounts—one common challenge

Fox News, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik
-wemple/wp/2017/12/16/rupert-murdoch-expertly-returns-the-sexual-harassment-spotlight
-to-fox-news/?utm_term=.eab74cecd1ad [https://perma.cc/X59P-LPWD].
26. Id.
27. Steel & Schmidt, supra note 9.
28. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, Compromise, and Release at 3, City of
Monroe Emps.’ Ret. Sys. ex rel. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. v. Murdoch, No. 2017-0833
-AGB (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2017). This agreement as well as the subsequent non-monetary relief
agreement were approved by the court on February 9, 2018. Jeff Montgomery, Fox’s
‘Unusual’ $90M Scandal Deal Gets Chancery’s OK, LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2018, 7:11 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1011154/fox-s-unusual-90m-scandal-deal-gets-chancery-s
-ok [https://perma.cc/J4M9-FWUK].
29. Non-Monetary Relief, supra note 10.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An
Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2014). But see Sean
J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075
(2016) (arguing that compliance does not fit within traditional models of corporate governance).
32. See Eric C. Chaffee, Creating Compliance: Exploring a Maturing Industry, 48 U.
TOL. L. REV. 429, 430–31 (2017).
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confronting modern organizations is how to appropriately assess and resolve
compliance questions. As a result, misconduct by and within organizations continues
to be a topic of significance for courts, regulators, prosecutors, and the individuals
affected or harmed, which, in turn, makes the field of compliance of great societal
import.33 Yet despite its recognized importance, significant compliance failures
persist.
Because compliance failures continue to occur, scholars, governmental actors,
and industry leaders are constantly proposing, implementing, and questioning
strategies aimed at improving organizations’ compliance programs. For example,
legal scholarship has discussed the importance of focusing on cultures of
compliance,34 the need for robust incentives from governmental actors,35 and the
propriety of permitting governmental actors to dictate corporate governance
reforms.36 Additionally, governmental actors are constantly experimenting with
methods for encouraging more compliant behavior by organizations, as evidenced
by the publication of recent guides on compliance programs37 and the Department of
Justice’s (DOJ) adoption of a pilot program meant to motivate self-disclosure and
cooperation by organizations.38 Similarly, industry leaders, such as the Association

33. See Cunningham, supra note 31, at 14 (explaining that the roots of compliance are
anchored in the intensification of organizational criminal liability).
34. Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933 (2017).
35. Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1003
(2017).
36. See Renee M. Jones & Michelle Welsh, Toward a Public Enforcement Model for
Directors’ Duty of Oversight, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 343 (2012) (arguing in favor of a
public enforcement model for the fiduciary duties of corporate directors). Compare
Cunningham, supra note 31 (arguing that prosecutors should invest in corporate governance
by contemplating it at the outset and articulating rationales for changes), and Griffith, supra
note 31 (arguing for a more limited governmental role in designing corporate governance
mechanisms), with Brandon L. Garrett, Rehabilitating Corporations, 66 FLA. L. REV. F. 1
(2014) (responding to Cunningham’s argument).
37. See, e.g., William H. Jordan, Edward T. Kang & Jason D. Popp, Government &
Internal Investigations Advisory: DOJ Releases Guidance on Compliance Programs, ALSTON
& BIRD (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.alston.com/en/insights/publications/2017/03/doj
-releases-guidance-on-compliance-programs [https://perma.cc/8JMB-5MQH] (discussing a
publication from DOJ Fraud explaining how it measures compliance programs and providing
information meant to help shape compliance policies); OIG Publishes Compliance Program
Effectiveness Guide, ARNALL GOLDEN GREGORY (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.agg.com
/Compliance-Program-Effectiveness-Guide-Published-by-OIG-04-25-2017 [https://perma.cc
/8QL2-J38T] (discussing document issued by the Health and Human Services Office of the
Inspector General on how to measure a compliance program’s effectiveness).
38. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division Launches New FCPA Pilot
Program (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/criminal-division
-launches-new-fcpa-pilot-program [https://perma.cc/2EA8-PUQB] (discussing the new DOJ
Pilot Program, which provides significant mitigation credit and, in some instances, a
declination to prosecute for companies confronting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
violation); see also Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks
at 34th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2017), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-34th
-international-conference-foreign [https://perma.cc/7TWS-FKFA] (some elements of the pilot
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of Corporate Counsel, often publish guidance and best practices aimed at assisting
organizations in their compliance efforts.39 Finally, the American Law Institute has
brought together a variety of constituencies in an effort to provide “a set of
recommended standards and best practices on the law of compliance and risk
management.”40
This Article contributes to the effort to improve compliance within organizations
by proposing a new method for evaluating compliance failures that focuses on the
discrete stages that make up the compliance process—prevention, detection,
investigation, and remediation. Importantly, the compliance process outlined is
applicable even when an organization has previously failed to demonstrate a robust
commitment to creating a culture of compliance. Additionally, because the proposed
compliance process frame may be utilized across regulatory areas and corporate
forms, this Article helps to cement the field of compliance as a discrete area of study.
Part I of this Article discusses the origins of the “effective compliance program”
mandate and its commonly accepted limitations. Part II sets forth the four stages
within a compliance process in an effort to provide a new framework for evaluating
compliance failures. Currently, organizations that experience a compliance failure
enter into a relatively broad inquiry focused on why their compliance program failed.
This Article, however, argues that firms facing complex compliance failures may
benefit from instead asking where within the compliance process did failure or
failures occur. Part III draws on insights from the fields of cognitive psychology,
behavioral economics, and behavioral ethics and argues that by assessing compliance
failures through the process frame proposed by this Article, organizations will be
able to better assess and understand the root cause of the breakdowns in their
compliance programs.41 Once the root cause, or causes, of a compliance failure is
understood, an organization will be better equipped to take appropriate measures
aimed at ensuring long-term change. Part IV addresses benefits and potential
concerns raised by the Article’s proposed framework.

program were subsequently made permanent via a new FCPA corporate enforcement policy);
Jonathan Sack, DOJ Announces It Will Extend FCPA “Pilot Program,” FORBES (Mar. 13,
2017, 11:16 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2017/03/13/doj-announces-it-will
-extend-fcpa-pilot-program/#4db34c31d3e1 [https://perma.cc/XS4F-RNLJ].
39. Kwamina Williford & Daniel Small, Establishing an Effective Compliance Program:
An Overview to Protecting Your Organization, ASS’N CORP. COUNS. (Jan. 25, 2013),
http://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/eaecp.cfm [https://perma.cc/ZGK8-DX2R].
40. Principles of the Law: Compliance, Enforcement, and Risk Management for
Corporations, Nonprofits, and Other Organizations, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org
/projects/show/compliance-enforcement-and-risk-management-corporations-nonprofits-and
-other-organizations/#_participants [https://perma.cc/3K99-E4MT].
41. The importance of engaging in a root-cause analysis was acknowledged by the DOJ
when discussing a program aimed at evaluating corporate compliance programs within firms.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 1, https://www
.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download [https://perma.cc/MM7N-NPBM].

212

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 94:203

I. THE (ELUSIVE) EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
Establishing an effective Compliance and Ethics Program (“Program”) has
become a necessity to protect any highly regulated organization.
– Association of Corporate Counsel42
Organizations accept the need to establish an effective compliance and ethics
program as a relatively uncontroversial reality. Thus, organizations understand that
they and their agents must adhere to legal and regulatory requirements, industry
practices, and the organization’s own internal policies and norms. This current
understanding of compliance has evolved, in part, due to (i) an increase in regulatory
requirements associated with a more complex administrative state, (ii) the addition
of duty of care obligations for boards of directors and other corporate managers, and
(iii) the increasing nature of governmental actors to pursue organizational criminal
liability.43
This Part begins by describing some of the rules, standards, and mandates that
require firms to implement compliance programs. The Part then explains how a
variety of incentives from enforcement agencies and prosecutors also exist to
encourage organizations to adopt compliance programs that are effective, despite
being imperfect. The Part concludes by outlining why perfect compliance would lead
to an inefficient amount of self-policing and, therefore, is generally not pursued.
A. Rules, Standards & Mandates
The field of compliance, like many areas of the law, consists of a mix of brightline rules and less precise standards. The mix of rules and standards work together
to establish the minimum levels of conduct firms must adopt to ensure that they have
created effective compliance programs. If an organization does not meet these rules
and standards, it becomes subject to certain consequences.
For example, the United States requires “truthful declarations to U.S. Customs
and Border Protection,” which allows “[c]ustoms officers . . . to scrutinize cultural
property . . . and prevent the inappropriate entry of such property.”44 This is a brightline rule with which, in theory, compliance should be relatively easy. In addition to
this bright-line rule, there are industry standards governing the sale and trade of
certain antiquities, which can be more complicated to implement into a compliance
program. For example, experts in the antiquities field know that “the acquisition of

42. Williford & Small, supra note 39.
43. Chaffee, supra note 32, at 429–30; see also Cunningham, supra note 31, at 14. This
Part does not include a discussion on the responsibilities of board of directors for compliance
efforts because these issues are briefly highlighted in Part II of the Article and more thoroughly
discussed in other works of legal scholarship. See, e.g., Symposium, The Caremark Decision
at 21––Corporate Compliance Comes of Age, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 597 (2018).
44. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. of N.Y., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United
States Files Civil Action to Forfeit Thousands of Ancient Iraqi Artifacts Imported by Hobby
Lobby (July 5, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/united-states-files-civil-action
-forfeit-thousands-ancient-iraqi-artifacts-imported
[https://perma.cc/B24F-QMWY]
[hereinafter Hobby Lobby Press Release].
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cultural property likely from Iraq, including cuneiform tablets and cylinder seals,
carries a risk that such objects may have been [improperly] looted from
archaeological sites in Iraq.”45 Thus, businesses dealing in antiquities should ensure
that (i) their customs declarations are truthful and honest and (ii) their compliance
program has policies in place that govern how to properly handle antiquities from
Iraq and other countries prone to antiquity theft.
In 2017, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (“Hobby Lobby”) entered into a settlement
with the U.S. government because it violated the operative rules and standards
controlling the acquisition of certain antiquities, including cuneiform tablets—clay
tablets with an ancient system of writing “that was used in ancient Mesopotamia
thousands of years ago.”46 It improperly shipped cultural artifacts into the United
States with falsified records regarding the artifacts’ country of origin and labeled the
contents of the shipments as “ceramic tiles.”47 Hobby Lobby engaged in these illegal
activities despite having received warnings from “an expert on cultural property law”
that Hobby Lobby itself retained.48 Thus, Hobby Lobby failed to have an effective
ethics and compliance program as it relates to the acquisition of antiquities.
The consequence of Hobby Lobby’s compliance failure is that it was forced to
forfeit many of the antiquities “and an additional sum of $3 million” to resolve a civil
action brought against it by the United States.49 Hobby Lobby also “agreed to adopt
internal policies and procedures governing its importation and purchase of cultural
property, provide appropriate training to its personnel, hire qualified outside customs
counsel and customs brokers, and submit quarterly reports to the government on any
cultural property acquisitions for the next eighteen months.”50 In short, Hobby Lobby
was required to create an ethics and compliance program with respect to the purchase
of antiquities. Thus, in addition to having to comply with the bright-line rule and
standards issued by the government, Hobby Lobby now also has a mandate, in the
form of a civil settlement agreement with the government that requires Hobby Lobby
to create a compliance program that addresses the purchase of antiquities.
The mandate to adopt certain compliance programs can come, as it did in the case
of Hobby Lobby, through a settlement agreement, but mandates are also sometimes
found directly within statutory or regulatory requirements. For example, the Bank
Secrecy Act requires banks to adopt compliance programs that include “[i]nternal
policies, procedures, and controls,” as well as the “[d]esignation of a compliance
officer” and “[o]ngoing employee training programs.”51 As such, an organization
subject to the Bank Secrecy Act and its corresponding regulations has a mandate to
adopt an ex ante ethics and compliance program. However, at the same time
government actors and scholars recognize that compliance programs must be tailored

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., FDIC, Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money Laundering and Office of Foreign
Asset Control, in RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES 8.1-1, 8.1-8,
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section8-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FTE2
-MTEA] (last updated Apr. 2005).
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to the specific firm implementing a compliance program because the compliance
needs of each organization will be different.52
Thus, there are a variety of rules, standards, and mandates in place that amount to
requirements that organizations develop compliance programs to address potential
misconduct. In addition to these measures, prosecutors and regulators engage in a
variety of efforts to incentivize firms to create effective ethics and compliance
programs.
B. Enforcement Incentives
Despite the existence of rules, standards, and mandates that require organizations
to engage in efforts to adopt effective ethics and compliance programs, compliance
failures have continued to occur. As a result, governmental actors also utilize a
variety of enforcement incentives to encourage firms to curb misconduct within their
ranks.53 Indeed, it has long been understood and well documented throughout law
and economics literature that “governments that want to effectively deter corporate
crime should provide firms with strong incentives to undertake corporate policing.”54
This is key because governmental actors have a very limited ability to detect
misconduct within private organizations and must rely on organizations to police
their own members. Thus, regulators and prosecutors have adopted a range of
policies and enforcement norms that serve as incentives for organizations to monitor
their members in an effort to deter and prevent corporate misconduct.
One example of a strong set of incentives utilized by regulators and prosecutors
comes from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which contains a section entitled
“Effective Compliance and Ethics Program.” That section requires organizations to
“exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct.”55 This provision is
part of what has become known as the Organizational Guidelines, which provide
mechanisms for sanctioning corporations for criminal misconduct.56 Specifically, the
Organizational Guidelines allow organizations to be “fined, sentenced to

52. See, e.g., OFAC FAQs: Sanctions Compliance, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_compliance.aspx [https://perma
.cc/GF7A-MSGP] (last updated July 17, 2018) (“There is no single compliance program
suitable for every financial institution.”).
53. One reason incentives from governmental actors remain quite important is that
corporate law jurisprudence has “essentially removed personal liability of directors and
officers from the range of remedies used to shape corporate conduct.” Lisa M. Fairfax, On the
Sufficiency of Corporate Regulation as an Alternative to Corporate Criminal Liability, 41
STETSON L. REV. 117, 117 (2011).
54. Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Enforcement in the United States: Using
Negotiated Settlements to Turn Potential Corporate Criminals into Corporate Cops 1, 9 (N.Y.
Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1712; Law & Econs. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17-09, 2018) (citations omitted),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2951972
[https://perma.cc/2WUT
-C7TH].
55. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
56. PAULA DESIO, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL
GUIDELINES, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/organizational-guidelines
/ORGOVERVIEW.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJ9G-RR9H].
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probation . . . ordered to make restitution . . . [required to] issue public notices of
conviction . . . and exposed to applicable forfeiture statutes.”57
Interestingly, the Organizational Guidelines, while technically applicable only to
criminal enforcement actions, have become an important tool that prosecutors and
regulators utilize to encourage corporations engaged in misconduct to settle claims
through the use of civil enforcement actions.58 The threat of criminal sanction under
the Organizational Guidelines has proven an effective mechanism for governmental
enforcement authorities to incentivize corporations to address and remediate
misconduct.
For example, when General Motors’s ignition switch scandal came to light, it
became clear that the company’s decision to ignore the faulty ignition switches
resulted in the injury and, in some cases, death of dozens of individuals.59 Despite
the company’s decision to ignore the problem for several years, the government
allowed General Motors to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement, a civil
agreement, to resolve the corporate misconduct.60 The agreement established that the
government would defer bringing criminal charges for three years if General Motors
agreed to undertake certain remediation efforts.61 Additionally, General Motors
agreed to have an independent monitor “review and assess policies, practices, and
procedures relating to [General Motors’s] safety-related public statements, sharing
of engineering data, and recall processes.”62 General Motors also agreed to forfeit
$900 million. At the conclusion of the three-year period, if General Motors performs
as expected under the deferred prosecution agreement, then the criminal charges
against it will be dismissed in their entirety.63
As demonstrated by this example, the government is able to utilize a variety of
enforcement incentives to motivate private firms to engage in specific behavior.64

57. Id.
58. Root, supra note 35, at 1014–16.
59. Brent Snavely, Court: GM Gets No Shield from Old Ignition-Switch Cases, USA
TODAY (Apr. 24, 2017, 12:07 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars
/2017/04/24/court-gm-gets-no-shield-old-ignition-switch-cases/100842980 [https://perma.cc
/THS9-YSF7] (“[A] defect that killed at least 124 people and injured 275 in small cars made
by the old GM.”).
60. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. N.Y., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan
U.S. Attorney Announces Criminal Charges Against General Motors and Deferred
Prosecution Agreement with $900 Million Forfeiture (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.justice
.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-criminal-charges-against-general
-motors-and-deferred [https://perma.cc/JT6K-UPE4] [hereinafter GM Press Release].
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. In previous work, I have argued that the government could utilize enforcement
incentives more aggressively and efficiently to incentivize organizations to implement robust
ethics and compliance programs if they would be more willing to utilize formal criminal
sanctions. See generally Root, supra note 35. Other enforcement incentives that governmental
actors might utilize would include things like debarment or withdrawal of a bank’s status as a
well-known, seasoned issuer. See Frequently Asked Questions: Suspension & Debarment,
GSA, https://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/192903 [https://perma.cc/XY3H-SMSZ] (last
updated Aug. 13, 2017); see also Joe Mont, New Guidance on SEC Waivers, Exemptions in
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When the government’s enforcement incentives are viewed in tandem with the preexisting rules, standards, and mandates that require organizations to adopt ethics and
compliance programs, one might think that organizations would engage in a robust
effort to ensure perfect compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. In
actuality, however, some compliance failures are not only expected, they are
accepted as necessary realities.
C. Imperfect Compliance
Despite the focus by regulators and prosecutors on the importance of developing
an effective compliance program, it is commonly understood that it would be
inefficient for firms to strive to obtain “perfect” compliance.65 Much of this
understanding comes from law and economics scholarship, which two decades ago
outlined the argument against a mandate for firms to achieve perfect compliance with
legal and regulatory demands.66
Organizations are sanctioned for misconduct, but the actual offenders are an
organization’s agents—the organization’s employees or members.67 Thus,
organizations are sanctioned not because they themselves commit crime, but because
they are held vicariously liable for the actions of their agents.68 The question debated
at the time was whether organizations should be held to a strict vicarious liability
standard, or something more malleable:
[Vicarious liability] is not only the most familiar regime of corporate
liability, but also is the most plausible one whenever agents only act in
the best interests of their principals––either because they share these
interests or because they do as they are told. In this situation, the firm’s
agents are logically compelled to avoid misbehavior if the firm must
internalize its costs. But when this condition does not hold––when the
firm has different interests from its agents and cannot control them
costlessly––then simple vicarious liability may no longer be the preferred
corporate incentive regime. In that case, the state cannot deter
misconduct simply by setting liability high enough to ensure that firms
cannot profit from it.

the Works, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/the
-filing-cabinet/new-guidance-on-sec-waivers-exemptions-in-the-works#.WZdBwlT3bCQ
[https://perma.cc/TRW6-BSC3].
65. Root, supra note 35, at 1033–36.
66. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997).
67. See id. at 690.
68. There are scholars who have advocated for a different method of attributing liability
to organizations for the conduct of their agents. For example, one might limit a finding of
organizational misconduct to circumstances where the organization’s agent acted “primarily
with the intent to benefit the firm.” Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal
Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 473–75 (2006) (“[C]ommon law courts . . . imported respondeat
superior liability from tort law into the criminal law . . . without serious theoretical analysis”).

2019]

THE COMPLIANCE PROCESS

217

Instead, the firm must be induced to take direct action to deter agents
from committing wrongs, including measures to prevent misconduct and
policing measures to detect and sanction it.69
The latter path was chosen, which resulted in prosecutors and enforcement agents
tolerating certain amounts of noncompliance with legal and regulatory requirements.
In part, this is because “strict liability enforcement, while the best regime for
‘inducing firms to sanction culpable agents,’ ‘may actually deter firms from
monitoring, investigating, or reporting’ corporate misconduct.”70
Recognizing this, in 2016 the DOJ Fraud Section (“DOJ Fraud”) initiated a pilot
program that allows corporations to reduce the sanction they would otherwise face
for violations under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which prohibits
bribery of foreign officials.71 To receive the lesser sanction, companies must
“voluntarily disclose misconduct, fully cooperate [with the DOJ], and timely and
appropriately remediate” the misconduct surrounding the FCPA violation.72 As a
result of the program, DOJ Fraud has issued several “declinations” to prosecute.73
One such declination was entered into between DOJ Fraud and Linde North America
Inc. and Linde Gas North America LLC (collectively, “Linde”).74 From November
2006 to December 2009, Linde “made corrupt payments to high-level officials at the
National High Technology Center (‘NHTC’) of the Republic of Georgia (‘Georgia’),
a 100% state-owned and -controlled entity” in an effort to receive the officials’
assistance in obtaining certain contracts related to the production of boron gas.75
Sanctions for FCPA violations vary, but previous empirical research suggests “the
sanction imposed in an FCPA action increases with the size of bribe, the profit related

69. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 66, at 690–91; see also V.S. Khanna, Corporate
Liability Standards: When Should Corporations Be Held Criminally Liable, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1239 (2000) (arguing in favor of a composite regime for sanctioning corporate
misconduct).
70. Root, supra note 35, at 1034 (quoting Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 66, at 701, 717).
71. Memorandum from Andrew Weissmann, Chief, Fraud Section, Criminal Div., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and
Guidance 1–2 (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog-entry/file/838386
/download [https://perma.cc/6F5Z-FE4V] [hereinafter FCPA Program Memo]. The program
was initially a one-year pilot program, but it was temporarily extended for an indeterminate
amount of time. Sack, supra note 38; see also Marc Alain Bohn & James G. Tillen, Evaluating
FCPA Pilot Program: Declinations on the Rise, LAW360 (Apr. 10, 2017, 5:10 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/905127/evaluating-fcpa-pilot-program
-declinations-on-the-rise [https://perma.cc/QQ87-X6JR].
72. FCPA Program Memo, supra note 71, at 3.
73. Declinations, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/pilot
-program/declinations [https://perma.cc/FCP9-2PCA] (last updated Aug. 23, 2018).
74. Letter from Jacob T. Elberg, Chief, Health Care & Gov’t Fraud Unit, U.S. Attorney’s
Office, Dist. of N.J. & Laura N. Perkins, Assistant Chief, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div.,
Fraud Section, to Lucinda Low & Thomas Best, Steptoe & Johnson LLP (June 16, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/974516/download
[https://perma.cc/DVE7
-7KK8] [hereinafter Linde Declination].
75. Id. at 1.
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to the bribe, [and] the amount of business affected by the bribe.”76 This possible
emphasis on correlating the seriousness of the offense with the sanction might be
consistent with attempting to adopt a near strict liability standard for corporations
engaged in FCPA violations. In contrast, granting a declination in the face of
multiyear, widespread bribery of multiple foreign officials would seem inapposite
with the goal of incentivizing firms to prevent misconduct within their ranks. The
government, however, has recognized that there are benefits to allowing for
imperfect compliance. In the case of Linde, the declination letter explained that
leniency was warranted because of:
(1) Linde’s timely, voluntary self-disclosure of the matter; (2) the
thorough, comprehensive and proactive investigation undertaken by
Linde; (3) Linde’s full cooperation in this matter (including its provision
of all known relevant facts about the individuals involved in or
responsible for the misconduct) and its agreement to continue to
cooperate in any ongoing investigations of individuals; (4) Linde’s
agreement to disgorge the profits . . . and forfeit to the United States the
corrupt proceeds . . . ; (5) the steps Linde has taken and continues to take
to enhance its compliance program and its internal accounting controls;
and (6) Linde’s full remediation (including terminating and/or taking
disciplinary action against the employees involved in the
misconduct . . . ).77
DOJ Fraud’s declination program and policy is just one of many ways in which
the government acknowledges that there are practical reasons to provide strong
incentives for firms to prevent and detect misconduct, while also acknowledging that
perfect compliance is an imprudent goal.
Thus, the admonition to enact an effective compliance program is not an effort
aimed at achieving perfect compliance. Instead, firms are tasked with engaging in
good faith efforts at ensuring that their members and employees engage in activity
that is in accordance with legal and regulatory requirements.
****
As highlighted by this Part, prudent organizations will implement ethics and
compliance programs in areas where they are subject to certain legal or regulatory
requirements or strong sets of mandates or potential sanctions. They are not,
however, expected to achieve perfect compliance because such a requirement might
have the unintended consequence of actually diminishing firms’ efforts to pursue
effective compliance programs. As a result, the quest for an effective compliance

76. Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 409, 440 (2014). But see F. Joseph
Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Veronica S. Root, Somebody’s Watching Me: FCPA
Monitorships and How They Can Work Better, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 321, 337 (2011) (explaining
that certain sanctions for violating FCPA violations, in particular the imposition of a corporate
monitor, are difficult to predict because no precise set of factors appears dispositive as part of
the government’s decision-making).
77. Linde Declination, supra note 74, at 2.
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program is something of a moving target and a seemingly elusive goal. Organizations
know they must implement a compliance program, but failure within these programs
is persistent. These failures have led firms to question continuously how they can
craft a more effective compliance program that is more likely to deter misconduct.
II. THE COMPLIANCE PROCESS
“Process” “a series of actions or operations conducing to an end.”78
As explained in Part I, governmental actors have long emphasized the importance
for firms to design effective ethics and compliance programs. Industry officials have
responded in kind by creating compliance programs within their organizations that
are often headed by chief compliance officers79 and sometimes include hundreds, if
not thousands, of compliance personnel.80 Yet, these same industry leaders and
enforcement authorities are asked each and every day to evaluate the cause of
compliance failures. To date, when organizations have undertaken these sorts of
inquiries, they have focused almost entirely on why the compliance program failed.
The presumption behind that inquiry, however, fails to prompt decision-makers
within firms to look beyond the surface cause or causes of the identified corporate
misconduct.
This Article suggests a new method of evaluating compliance failures by asking
at what stage in the compliance process did the failure or failures occur. Reframing
the inquiry when compliance failures occur from a generalized discussion about a
firm’s compliance program to a more specific discussion that references particular
stages within the compliance process may assist in creating, implementing, and
modifying compliance programs in a more effective manner.81 This Part discusses

78. Process, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/process
[https://perma.cc/ZZ3R-T75D] (last updated Sept. 20, 2018).
79. See Deloitte, How Chief Compliance Officers Can Make an Immediate Impact, WALL
ST. J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (May 15, 2017, 12:01 AM), http://deloitte.wsj.com/riskand
compliance/2017/05/15/how-chief-compliance-officers-can-make-an-immediate-impact-2
[https://perma.cc/PV39-RP26].
80. Jill Treanor, JP Morgan Chase Hires 3,000 New Staff in Its Compliance Department,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2013, 4:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/sep
/17/jpmorgan-banking [https://perma.cc/Z3JC-MBQ8].
81. For example, in 2007 the chief executive officer of BP stated: “Our operations failed
to meet our own standards and the requirements of the law.” RICHARD M. STEINBERG,
GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE: IT CAN’T HAPPEN TO US—AVOIDING
CORPORATE DISASTER WHILE DRIVING SUCCESS 93 (2011). He pledged to improve the
company’s risk management processes. This was a relatively general statement that led to a
broad inquiry that did not have effective results. “Federal officials and industry experts say
BP continued to lag other oil companies on safety.” Id. Similarly, governmental actors often
set up relatively broad inquiries when drafting requirements for firms that enter into settlement
agreements, which routinely focus on activities that would fall under the categories of
prevention and detection with no mention of a need to establish policies related to investigation
or remediation. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at C-1–C-8, United States v.
Keppel Offshore & Marine Ltd., No. 17-CR-697 (KAM) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1021786/download
[https://perma.cc/7DSC
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each stage undertaken within the compliance process—prevention, detection,
investigation, and remediation—in turn.82
Before turning to these stages, however, it is important to remember that
misconduct within organizations occurs in a variety of ways and in many different
contexts. And some contexts suggest that the organization has no desire to adopt
policies or programs that are compliant with legal and regulatory requirements. There
are many examples of significant organizational misconduct where this Article’s
framework will not be of significant use because the organization is not committed
or interested in improving its compliance program.83 As such, this Article’s
framework will be most helpful for (i) organizations that are committed to ferreting
out compliance failures and (ii) regulators or prosecutors engaged in robust
investigations of corporate misconduct.
Additionally, in many instances the compliance process is effectively and
routinely performed in its entirety by one person, department, or external consultant.
This Article is not suggesting that compliance officers should start evaluating each
and every decision as a stage in a compliance process. For relatively simple
compliance failures, it may not be necessary for the firm to pay careful attention to
what compliance stage it is in. When, however, the compliance failure is more
significant, it becomes more important that the compliance stage is carefully
considered when engaging in compliance activities.
A. Prevention
The stage of prevention involves actions undertaken to prevent compliance
failures from occurring within a firm. In some instances, that prevention happens by
refusing to endorse certain information—like when an auditor refuses to certify
certain financial statements because they fail to meet regulatory or industry
standards.84 In other instances, prevention involves setting up systems and policies
that will stop conduct from occurring within the firm that would violate legal
mandates.85

-B88N] (outlining the need to adopt new policies, new training procedures, and new methods
for detecting and monitoring misconduct within the firm).
82. In previous work, I briefly flagged the concept that there are multiple stages in the
compliance effort. See Veronica Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 109,
157 (2016). In that work, I framed the inquiry slightly differently than I do here because I
combined prevention and detection into one stage. Further time and contemplation have
convinced me that prevention and detection are distinct stages within compliance efforts.
83. For example, Volkswagen’s purposeful use of an emissions-compliance “defeat
device,” as well as a variety of other examples of corporate misconduct would have occurred
regardless of whether this Article’s process frame was utilized by the organization because the
commitment to corrupt activities was stronger than a commitment to compliance. See Russell
Hotten, Volkswagen: The Scandal Explained, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772 [https://perma.cc/3GEU-AKCW].
84. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308 (2004).
85. See, e.g., Root, supra note 35, at 1013–16 (discussing enforcement actions that
required firms to set up systems reasonably designed to prevent certain types of misconduct
within a firm).
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To clarify, prevention does not mean perfection, as it is commonly accepted by
scholars, regulators, and industry officials that “perfect” compliance is not the
ultimate goal of the compliance program.86 Instead, what is expected is that firms
take reasonable efforts to create systems and policies that will prevent the types of
risks that the firm might reasonably be contemplated to confront. It is certainly true
that all compliance failures have some element of a “prevention” failure, because if
a compliance failure occurred within a firm, it was not prevented. For purposes of
this Section, however, the prevention stage is concerned with instances of corporate
misconduct where the primary compliance failure appears to have been one of
prevention. In other words, the firm failed to appropriately conceive of its
responsibilities associated with prevention and as a result, wrongdoing occurred.
For example, the Enron scandal appears, at core, to be a failure of prevention.
Enron Corporation (“Enron”) “was almost universally considered one of the
country’s most innovative companies” in the late 1990s.87 Enron bought and sold
“gas and electricity futures,” but it also “created whole new markets for such oddball
‘commodities’ as broadcast time for advertisers, weather futures, and Internet
bandwidth.”88 At its most successful, Enron was worth approximately $70 billion,
but the value of the firm diminished significantly when it admitted to misstating its
income and “that its equity value was a couple of billion dollars less than its balance
sheet said.”89 The prevention failure was twofold. First, the external actor meant to
withhold its certification or approval of certain activities—Arthur Andersen LLP
—failed to do so.90 Arthur Andersen’s failure resulted in Enron engaging in
accounting practices that improperly misstated the true value of the firm and
ultimately led to Enron’s total collapse. Second, Enron’s board of directors approved
a series of transactions fraught with serious, atypical conflicts of interest, which
enriched Enron officials, including its chief financial officer.91 The results of Enron’s
misconduct were devastating and vast, but at its core, the compliance failure was one
of a lack of prevention.
The importance of preventing misconduct within firms is not a new phenomenon.
Indeed, one of the seminal cases on fiduciary duties and arguably one of the founding
cases in modern compliance law—Caremark—began with a prevention failure.92 In
Caremark, the board of directors explicitly sought the guidance of lawyers and
accountants regarding the propriety of making certain payments to physicians, but it
was given poor advice from both sets of gatekeepers, which resulted in the

86. See supra Section I.C.
87. The Fall of Enron, NPR, http://www.npr.org/news/specials/enron [https://perma.cc
/N9D7-BZSP].
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR., RAYMOND S. TROUBH & HERBERT S. WINOKUR, JR.,
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 1–17 (2002).
91. See id. at 8–9.
92. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). In
Caremark, the Delaware Chancery Court outlined the obligation that board of directors and
other corporate managers have “under the duty of care to maintain adequate internal controls
and compliance programs.” Chaffee, supra note 32, at 430.
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company’s indictment as well as other significant sanctions levied by the Department
of Health & Human Services and DOJ.93
Thus, the idea that compliance officials are responsible for preventing misconduct
within their respective organizations is not at all new. Yet when organizations are
given an admonition to construct or fix their internal compliance programs, the
importance of considering the particular stage of prevention might get lost within
broader discussions about the more general compliance program. By honing in on
the various stages within the compliance process, officials charged with assessing
compliance failures may be more likely to assess prevention activities in a more
direct and complete manner.
B. Detection
The stage of detection involves an organization’s policies aimed at detecting
misconduct, risks, or errors within its ranks. Detection is particularly complex
because the organization must detect when an agent acts outside the parameters of
internal policies set up as part of the company’s preventive efforts,94 but it must also
detect potential risks that might result in harm to third parties or itself.95
For example, the primary cause of the General Motors ignition switch scandal
appears to have been a detection failure. General Motors is a global automotive
company headquartered in Detroit, Michigan.96 It currently has over 180,000
employees on five continents and is a storied American corporation.97 In 2014, news
of a potentially deadly defect in the functioning of ignition switches of certain
General Motors’s vehicles came to light.98 An investigation ensued, which
determined that while engineers had identified problems with the ignition switch as
early as 2002, the full scope of the defect was not detected. Indeed:
[S]ophisticated engineers with responsibility to provide customers with
safe and reliable automobiles – did not understand one of the most
fundamental consequences of the switch failing and the car stalling: the
airbags would not deploy. The failure of the switch meant that drivers
were without airbag protection at the time they needed it most. This
failure, combined with others . . . led to devastating consequences.99

93. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 960–62.
94. For example, the Bank Secrecy Act requires firms to implement specific policies
aimed at stopping money-laundering activity. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2012) (explaining that
the purpose of the statute is to “guard against money laundering”).
95. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
96. About, GEN. MOTORS, https://www.gm.com/company/about-gm.html [https://perma
.cc/K54B-2YBT].
97. Id.
98. Peter Valdes-Dapena & Tal Yellin, GM: Steps to a Recall Nightmare, CNN MONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/infographic/pf/autos/gm-recall-timeline/index.html [https://perma.cc
/U4T3-MGZV].
99. ANTON R. VALUKAS, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL MOTORS
COMPANY REGARDING IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS 1 (2014).
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As a result of the failure to understand the full ramifications of the defect, General
Motors improperly classified the ignition switch defect as one of “customer
convenience” instead of as a “safety” issue.100 This misclassification resulted in the
belief that fixing the ignition switch defect was a low-priority concern, which
resulted in General Motors’s failure to comply with regulatory requirements, as well
as related industry practice, regarding the recall of unsafe automobile components.101
Additionally, subsequent committees charged with considering the implementation
of a fix for the ignition switch also failed to reclassify the problem as a safety issue.102
Indeed, a group “charged with identifying and remedying safety issues, made the
same mistake; it opened and closed an investigation in 2005 in the span of a month,
finding no safety issue to be remedied.”103 Yet in 2007, both a Wisconsin Safety
Patrol trooper and an Indiana University research team correctly detected the
connection between the faulty ignition switch and the nondeployment of airbags.104
Finally, a group of internal lawyers at General Motors who were charged with using
settlement data to generate settlement forecasts and detect trends indicating safety
issues abdicated this responsibility.105
Like prevention, the importance of detecting potential misconduct, risks, or errors
is well-settled within corporate law jurisprudence. For example, in Stone v. Ritter,106
the bank adopted an anti-money laundering program, but the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network determined that the program was
deficient because the bank had “a fragmented program in which areas of the Bank
had information on suspicious activity that was never communicated to those
responsible for Bank Secrecy Act compliance.”107 As such, while the bank formally
detected the potential misconduct, it failed to structure the program in a manner that
allowed the people responsible for evaluating the behavior to detect it.
Again, the idea that compliance officials are responsible for detecting compliance
failures within their respective organizations is not novel. Indeed, the Organizational
Guidelines specifically instruct organizations on the importance of detecting
misconduct within their ranks.108 But it is not clear that organizations make a
concerted effort to specifically evaluate the role a detection failure may have
contributed to the general failure within its compliance program.

100. Id. at 2–3.
101. See id. at 3–5; see also Bill Vlasic & Hilary Stout, Auto Industry Galvanized After
Record Recall Year, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com
/2014/12/31/business/a-year-of-record-recalls-galvanizes-auto-industry-into-action.html
[https://perma.cc/4L8B-GQTZ] (discussing how the General Motors scandal has impacted
industry standards regarding vehicle recalls).
102. VALUKAS, supra note 99, at 2–5.
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 107–15.
106. No. Civ.A. 1570-N, 2006 WL 302558, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2006) (“This case is
not about a board’s failure to carefully consider a material corporate decision that was
presented to the board. This is a case where information was not reaching the board because
of ineffective internal controls.”).
107. Id. at *1.
108. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2016).
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C. Investigation
The stage of investigation involves a firm’s policies and practices targeted at
determining the existence of and, if relevant, scope of the compliance failure.
Investigation requires discovering the facts surrounding the failure, so that decisionmakers at the firm are equipped with a sufficient amount of knowledge to make
informed decisions about the appropriate next steps.109 The investigative stage is
particularly tricky because it inevitably starts with the detection stage and often
continues on after the firm has begun its remediation efforts. The importance of the
investigation stage, however, cannot be overstated, and even if completed in
conjunction with detection or remediation, it is its own discrete stage within
compliance efforts.110 And failures at the investigatory stage, just as with prevention
and detection, can be devastating for firms.
For example, the Wells Fargo fake account scandal appears to have been
exacerbated in large part due to deliberate actions taken by bank officials to block a
thorough and proper investigation of the inappropriate conduct within the firm.111
Wells Fargo provides “diversified financial services,” which include a community
bank division that provides traditional banking services to consumers and small
businesses.112 “From 2011 to mid-2016 – but possibly going back to 2009 or before
– Wells [Community Bank] employees created more than 1.5 million unauthorized
deposit accounts and issued more than 500,000 unauthorized credit card applications.
These accounts racked up $2.6 million in fees for the bank.”113 A subsequent
investigation by the board of directors for the bank identified failures with the bank’s
investigative function. First, it determined that “Community Bank leadership resisted
and impeded outside scrutiny or oversight and, when forced to report, minimized the
scale and nature of the problem.”114 Second, it determined that the former chief
executive officer “was too slow to investigate or critically challenge sales practices
in the Community Bank.”115 In addition to these findings in the board’s report,
reporting indicates that Wells Fargo employees were fired after reporting to their
supervisors regarding the fraudulent behavior within the Community Bank.116 If

109. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR COMPANIES AND THEIR
COUNSEL IN CONDUCTING INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 2 (2008).
110. See id. at 22 (discussing the use of internal investigation work product to assist in
remediation needs and efforts).
111. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS OF THE BOARD OF WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, SALES
PRACTICES INVESTIGATION REPORT (2017) [hereinafter WELLS FARGO REPORT].
112. History of Wells Fargo, WELLS FARGO, https://www.wellsfargo.com/about
/corporate/history [https://perma.cc/LK7R-RFAT]; see also Wayne Thompson, Wells Fargo
Unveils Organizational Changes in Its Community Bank, WELLS FARGO (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://stories.wf.com/wells-fargo-unveils-organizational-changes-community-bank [https://
perma.cc/ZCX8-K2WC].
113. The Wells Fargo Fake Account Scandal: A Timeline, FORBES, https://www.forbes
.com/pictures/ejhj45fjij/two-million-phony-accoun/#4f1d8e7a6f24 [https://perma.cc/8JSY
-TSYE].
114. WELLS FARGO REPORT, supra note 111, at Overview.
115. Id.
116. See Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Whistle-Blower Wins $5.4 Million and His Job Back,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/business/04-wells-fargo
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Wells Fargo had acted on the misconduct that was detected within its ranks and
properly investigated the allegations, it could have, at a minimum, stopped the
misconduct at an earlier date. Instead, officials at the firm disregarded the
information they received and failed to trigger the investigative stage within the
compliance process.
Again, like prevention and detection, the importance of utilizing appropriate
investigative methods when confronting potential firm misconduct is commonly
accepted. For example, in Auerbach v. Bennett,117 the court evaluated whether a
board engaged in an appropriate investigation of misconduct within a corporation.
The court explained that “[a]s to the methodologies and procedures best suited to the
conduct of an investigation of facts and the determination of legal liability, the courts
are well equipped by long and continuing experience and practice to make
determinations.”118 It ultimately determined that the board’s actions were proper and
noted that “[t]he selection of appropriate investigative methods must always turn on
the nature and characteristics of the particular subject being investigated.”119
The importance of a robust investigation in the face of a compliance failure has
long been an important component of organizational compliance efforts. There are
numerous documents outlining the best industry practices for conducting internal
investigations.120 The idea, however, that the investigation itself might fail or be
deficient in some manner is not typically considered. The assumption is that the
investigation will present a solution, not serve as the impetus of the compliance
failure. Yet by purposefully considering whether the investigation itself contributed
to the compliance challenges faced by the organization, compliance officials may
develop a better understanding regarding the root cause of the compliance failures
facing their organizations.
D. Remediation
The stage of remediation involves a firm’s strategies for responding to and
recovering from the misconduct uncovered at the detection and investigation stages.

-whistleblower-fired-osha.html [https://perma.cc/9E6G-JGA6]. But see WELLS FARGO
REPORT, supra note 111, at 87–88 n.26 (indicating that the board and counsel were still
reviewing allegations of retaliation against potential whistleblowers).
117. 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
118. Id. at 1002.
119. Id. at 1003.
120. See, e.g., Daniel P. Elms, Documents from Internal Investigation Protected by
Privilege, ABA: LITIG. NEWS (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation
/publications/litigation-news/top-stories/2015/documents-from-internal-investigation
-protected-by-privilege.html [https://perma.cc/LXW2-5E7M]; Barry F. McNeil & Brad D.
Brian, Overview: Initialing an Internal Investigation and Assembling the Investigative Team,
in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS (Brad D. Brian, Barry F. McNeil & Lisa J. Demsky
eds., 4th ed. 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation
/materials/2017_sac/written_materials/1_chapter_1_overview_initialing_an_internal_investi
gation.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/MVZ7-NGKZ]; Sidley Austin, Conducting
Internal Investigations: A Primer, ABA (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam
/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2015_corporate_counselcleseminar/Materials/3b1_12
_conducting_internal_investigations.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/XPH2-UCHW].
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The remediation stage provides firms an opportunity to expressly confront the
misconduct that occurred in a manner targeted at addressing the compliance failure
completely and thoroughly. In some instances a remediation effort may involve
compensating victims for a harm caused as part of a mandate from a government
regulator,121 and in other instances it may require developing a robust set of policies
and procedures targeted to prevent similar misconduct in the future in an effort to
comply with the Organizational Guidelines.122 Regardless of the particular tasks that
are required for the remediation effort, it is an important last step in a firm’s effort to
address misconduct in its ranks.
For example, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC (“Credit Suisse”) failed to
address deficiencies in its anti-money laundering compliance program and, as a
result, was fined $16.5 million by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA) in December 2016.123 While a number of factors ultimately led to the fine,
one of the concerns was Credit Suisse’s failure to properly remediate misconduct.
Specifically, the Accept, Waiver, and Consent settlement between Credit Suisse and
FINRA explained that in December 2013, a “consulting firm issued a detailed report
identifying numerous inadequacies in the firm’s implementation” of an anti-money
laundering automated system.124 Credit Suisse “developed a plan to fully remediate
the issues identified by the consultant, and in 2015 retained additional consultants to
help improve the system, [but] it initially failed to devote adequate resources and
funding to resolve the issues identified by the consulting firm[s] in an adequately
timely fashion.”125
The importance of remediation efforts, like prevention, detection, and
investigation, continues to be emphasized by enforcement authorities. For example,
in 2016, then DOJ Fraud Section Chief Andrew Weissmann commented that
“companies are not focused enough on the remediation that should follow findings

121. For example, one component of the Independent Foreclosure Review was that banks
were required to “remediate all financial injury to borrowers caused by any errors,
misrepresentations, or other deficiencies.” Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, OCC Takes Enforcement Action Against Eight
Servicers for Unsafe and Unsound Foreclosure Practices (Apr. 13, 2011),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2011/nr-occ-2011-47.html [https://
perma.cc/VNT4-DUMC].
122. Root, supra note 82, at 128 (discussing corporate compliance monitorships, which
require a remediation effort that “involves an overhaul of the organization’s corporate
compliance program with respect to the area of misconduct”).
123. Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., FINRA Fines Credit Suisse Securities
(USA) LLC $16.5 Million for Significant Deficiencies in Its Anti-Money Laundering Program
(Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.finra.org/newsroom/2016/finra-fines-credit-suisse-165-million
-significant-deficiencies-its-aml-program [https://perma.cc/SY68-JAPW]; see also FINRA
Fines Firm for Deficient AML Monitoring—Are Your Policies Up to Par?, VENABLE LLP
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.venable.com/finra-fines-firm-for-deficient-aml-monitoringare
-your-policies-up-to-par-12-12-2016 [https://perma.cc/53JA-4LCY].
124. Letter from Jeffrey P. Bloom, Senior Special Counsel, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth.,
to Dep’t of Enforcement, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 6 (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www
.finra.org/sites/default/files/CreditSuisse_AWC_120516.pdf [https://perma.cc/UJX7-S2HN]
[hereinafter Credit Suisse AWC].
125. Id.
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of misconduct.”126 Indeed, he stressed that based on the comparative falloff in
attention given to matters of remediation, he expects for the government to use
formal tools to encourage more systematic regulation like the use of corporate
monitors—independent, private outsiders—to oversee remediation efforts within
firms.127
A failure of a remediation effort is particularly susceptible to being overlooked as
a root cause of an organization’s compliance failures. A firm cannot have a
remediation effort unless there was a failure at one of the three preceding stages
within compliance efforts. As such, it may be easy for organizations to focus their
attention on issues of prevention, detection, and investigation at the expense of a
robust analysis regarding the organization’s efforts to remediate misconduct. Yet
examples like Credit Suisse and Fox News demonstrate the importance of evaluating
the relative success or failure of an organization’s remediation effort when
attempting to ascertain the full scope and breadth of a compliance failure within the
organization.
****
Thus, the effective compliance program may be broken up into the four distinct
stages of prevention, detection, investigation, and remediation.

This Article is not arguing that these stages are always completed at a separate
point of time. A competent compliance officer may engage in the detection and
investigative processes at the same time and then go on to institute a remediation
process that bleeds into the creation of prevention policies. This Article also is not
arguing that misconduct typically only occurs within one stage or, as evidenced by
the Fox News example, a compliance failure might encompass deficiencies within

126. 2016 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www
.gibsondunn.com/2016-year-end-fcpa-update [https://perma.cc/V6PR-PE34].
127. Id.
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all four stages of the compliance process. This Article argues that these are distinct
tasks, and when these stages are considered discretely and independently, the root
cause of compliance failures may be easier to identify and rectify.
Thus, the upshot of this Article is that there is a class of compliance failures where
utilizing the evaluative framework proposed above may be helpful in identifying the
root cause of the failure and developing a plan for the future that will avoid similar
misconduct. For firms engaged in a rather intense struggle to implement an effective
compliance program in the midst of multiple compliance deficiencies, it may be
helpful to conceive of the compliance challenge as having multiple, discrete
components.
III. REFRAMING THROUGH THE COMPLIANCE PROCESS
As demonstrated above, scholars, regulators, and industry leaders have long
considered strategies for addressing compliance failures. In doing so, they have
mentioned the importance of certain aspects within the compliance process like
prevention and remediation. They have not, however, suggested using these aspects
as a method of framing the analytical assessment of compliance failures in a more
systematic way. This Article—relying on insights from cognitive psychology,
behavioral economics, and behavioral ethics—argues that changing the frame by
which compliance failures are assessed may help to better determine the root cause
of the breakdown within an organization’s compliance system.128
Framing, as explained by cognitive psychologists and applied to decision-making
models by scholars within the field of behavioral economics, can drastically change
the manner in which people process information.129 This change can occur because
“choices depend, in part, on the way in which problems are stated.”130 Thus, by
restating the problem from “how or why did this compliance failure occur” to “at
what stages within the compliance process did breakdowns occur,” those responsible
for analyzing compliance failures within organizations might focus their inquiries in
a more precise way.
Root-cause analysis is a tool often employed by business professionals to
determine why certain actions or phenomenon occurred within an organization or
industry.131 In particular, root-cause analysis is meant to:

128. Business and legal scholars have previously identified the benefits of utilizing insights
from cognitive psychology, behavioral economics, or behavioral ethics to assess compliance
challenges. See, e.g., Todd Haugh, The Ethics of Intracorporate Behavioral Ethics, 8 CALIF.
L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2017); Langevoort, supra note 34, at 936, 946, 950.
129. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 39–40 (Penguin Books 2009). Richard H. Thaler has been
awarded the 2017 Nobel Prize in Economics for his work in the field of behavioral economics,
including the insights provided in Nudge. Frank Armstrong III, Richard Thaler, A Giant in
Economics, Awarded the Nobel Prize, FORBES (Oct. 13, 2017, 12:04 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/frankarmstrong/2017/10/13/richard-thaler-a-giant-in-economics
-awarded-the-nobel-prize/#280b50933a10 [https://perma.cc/D6VH-G3VJ].
130. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 129, at 40.
131. Root-cause analysis is distinct from Enterprise Risk Management. Enterprise Risk
Management is “a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other
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[A]nswer the following questions: (1) What happened? (What, exactly,
was the ultimate outcome?); (2) Why did it happen? (What causal factors
contributed to the outcome?); and (3) What can you do to prevent it from
happening again? (What system changes can be put in place to anticipate
and intervene in the errors that inevitably occur in human activities?).132
Properly ascertaining the root cause of a compliance failure is important for those
charged with creating, implementing, maintaining, and enforcing compliance norms
and mandates. If the root cause of a compliance failure is mis- or only partiallyidentified, the ability to prevent similar failures in the future is severely limited.
This Part demonstrates how reframing the assessment of compliance failures
through the four stages of compliance outlined in Part II—prevention, detection,
investigation, and remediation—might assist industry leaders and policymakers in
evaluating and identifying the root cause of certain compliance failures. To
demonstrate the potential of utilizing the proposed process frame, this Part discusses
four compliance efforts that were plagued by significant missteps. When these
compliance activities are assessed under a process frame, new considerations are
revealed.
The first example comes from the Apple monitorship and suggests that part of
what caused the difficult remediation effort was confusion regarding the proper role
of the monitor and the appropriate scope of duties. The second example comes from
a bank’s engagement of the Promontory Financial Group, LLC (“Promontory”) to
assist it with a series of compliance failures, which resulted in a failure to apprehend
when Promontory’s role with the company converted in a manner that required more
independence. The third example demonstrates how the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) misunderstood the expansive nature of its own consent order’s
demands, which wasted millions of dollars and stalled remediation payments to
homeowners. And the fourth example demonstrates how Baylor University lacked a
true commitment to compliance with regulatory guidance, despite its statements to
the contrary.
A. Example 1: Role Confusion
In 2013, a district court judge, in a civil action brought by DOJ Antitrust, found
Apple to have engaged in improper collusive activity in the sale of e-books.133 The

personnel, applied in strategy-setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential
events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives.” Office of the President,
Univ. of Cal., What is ERM?, U.C., http://www.ucop.edu/enterprise-risk-management
/procedures/what-is-erm.html [https://perma.cc/V32K-XMYR]. Enterprise Risk Management
is made up of four primary objectives, which have eight additional interrelated components.
Id. The goal of Enterprise Risk Management is to understand what sort of future risks an
organization may encounter. Id. Root-cause analysis is an attempt to understand why an event
occurred. Root-cause analysis could be used to assist in efforts to develop an Enterprise Risk
Management process, but the two efforts are distinct.
132. Charles M. Key, Toward a Safer Health System: Medical Injury Compensation and
Medical Quality, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 459, 464 (2007).
133. Nate Raymond, Apple Cannot Escape U.S. States’ E-Book Antitrust Cases: Judge,
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court appointed a monitor to oversee Apple’s remediation efforts with respect to its
antitrust compliance program.134 The Apple monitorship was, however, plagued with
a variety of problems, which have been attributed to potential cronyism in the
monitorship appointment,135 a lack of appropriate limitations regarding the
appointment of monitors,136 and my own suggestion that the evolution and
prevalence of modern-day monitors had muddied the understandings of the
appropriate limitations for court-appointed monitors.137 There does, however, appear
to be another account that reveals itself when one considers the difficulties
surrounding the Apple monitorship utilizing a compliance process frame: instead of
taking on the role of overseeing the remediation of Apple’s antitrust compliance
program, the monitor attempted to take on a broader preventative task that included
undertaking activities unrelated to Apple’s antitrust program.
1. Difficulties with the Apple Monitorship
The district court’s order requiring Apple to submit to a monitorship stated that
the monitor was to “review and evaluate Apple’s existing internal antitrust
compliance policies and procedures” and “to recommend to Apple changes to
address any perceived deficiencies in those policies, procedures, and training.”138
Apple was not pleased about the imposition of the monitor but upon reviewing the
district court’s order did not initially file objections. This changed, however, when
the monitor began to engage in activities broader than what Apple originally
contemplated as appropriate under the court order.139 For example, the monitor
sought to interview “Apple’s entire executive team and its entire board of directors,”
even though many of these individuals had not been involved in antitrust matters.140
The district court did not attempt to restrain the monitor’s behavior and instead
seemed to approve of the monitor’s view that he needed to “crawl inside the
company,” so as to ascertain Apple’s tone and culture at a very broad level.141

REUTERS (Apr. 15, 2014, 5:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-ebooks/apple
-cannot-escape-u-s-states-e-book-antitrust-cases-judge-idUSBREA3E1Y520140415 [https://
perma.cc/KXW4-KLYB].
134. For a more detailed account of the Apple monitorship, see Root, supra note 82.
135. See John Dean, Michael Bromwich’s Apple Monitoring Continues: Chapter Two,
VERDICT (Feb. 21, 2014), https://verdict.justia.com/2014/02/21/michael-bromwichs-apple
-monitoring-continues-chapter-two [https://perma.cc/PS3N-67WW].
136. See Roger Parloff, Rocky Term of Apple’s Ebooks Antitrust Monitor Will Expire
Friday, FORTUNE (Oct. 13, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/10/13/apple-antitrust-monitor
-term-expiring [https://perma.cc/B5DX-AQQH] (noting a dissenting opinion from a Second
Circuit ruling that determined that “the manner in which Judge Cote had structured
Bromwich’s appointment . . . ‘warp[ed] the role of a neutral, court-appointed referee into that
of an adversary party’”).
137. See Root, supra note 82, at 132–38.
138. United States v. Apple, Inc., Nos. 1:12-CV-2826, 1:12-CV-3394, 2013 WL 4774755,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2013).
139. Root, supra note 82, at 134.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 135 (alteration omitted).
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Eventually the Second Circuit reigned in the scope of the monitorship, but the
damage was done.142
As a result of the dispute regarding the appropriate scope of the monitor’s duties,
a variety of consequences occurred. The monitorship and the district court were
highly criticized.143 The relationship between the monitor and Apple became
contentious and plagued with various rounds of litigation.144 Ultimately, the Second
Circuit went so far as to criticize the monitor’s actions in a written opinion. 145 As
such, a rather typical, at least at the outset, remediation effort ended up being far
from successful on a number of objective measures.
2. The Apple Monitorship Under the Compliance Process Frame
It is relatively simple—and correct—to look at the Apple monitorship and classify
it as a remediation effort gone wrong. But the goal of the process frame is to utilize
the stages to determine the root cause of why it went wrong. Determining the root
cause requires an inquiry into the actions of the monitor, judge, government, and
Apple to determine why the remediation effort was plagued by so many challenges.
The facts demonstrate that the initial moment of tension between the monitor and
Apple occurred when the monitor attempted to interview Apple’s entire executive
team and board of directors, which included individuals who had no responsibility
or interaction with antitrust policies or procedures.146 This initial dispute turned into
a much larger battle regarding the appropriate scope of the monitor’s authority, with
the monitor, government, and court taking a rather broad interpretation of the
monitor’s authority and Apple insisting that the monitor was overstepping.147
The activities the monitor engaged in that Apple complained about, however, did
look unusual for a typical remediation effort. As explained in Part II:
The stage of remediation involves a firm’s strategies for responding to
and recovering from the misconduct uncovered at the detection and
investigation stages. The remediation stage provides firms an
opportunity to expressly confront the misconduct that occurred in a
manner targeted at addressing the compliance failure completely and
thoroughly.148

142. Id. at 136–37.
143. Apple’s Star Chamber: An Abusive Judge and Her Prosecutor Friend Besiege the
Tech Maker, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2013, 7:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple8217s
-star-chamber-1386288543?tesla=y [https://perma.cc/7AT5-FXNJ].
144. Nate Raymond, U.S. Judge Says Apple E-Books Antitrust Monitor’s Term to End,
REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2015, 7:07 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-ebooks
-monitor/u-s-judge-says-apple-e-books-antitrust-monitors-term-to-end
-idUSKCN0S719G20151013 [https://perma.cc/A9AU-7ZV9].
145. Jeff John Roberts, Appeals Court Scolds Apple Monitor, but Does Not Remove Him,
FORTUNE (May 28, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/05/28/appeals-court-scolds-apple
-monitor-but-does-not-remove-him [https://perma.cc/385P-4ABY].
146. See supra Section III.A.1.
147. See supra Section III.A.1.
148. See supra Section II.D.
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The Apple monitor, however, went beyond activity that was tied to remedying
Apple’s antitrust misconduct and sought to address a much broader scope of conduct.
Indeed, careful reflection suggests the monitor attempted to take on more of a
prevention role. Instead of directly tying his activities to addressing the antitrust
misconduct at Apple, the monitor engaged in activities that looked similar to what
one might do if he or she were creating a compliance program from scratch. But the
original court order had not contemplated the creation of a compliance program; it
required modifications to the existing program—a much narrower task.
This leads one to wonder why the monitor, with support from the district court
judge and government attorneys, engaged in activities that were broader than what
would be found in a typical remediation effort. In part, this might have been a result
of what behavioral economics terms cognitive conservatism. “Once an impression is
gained, it is insufficiently revised to reflect new information. There is a bias to the
status quo. Especially in noisy information environments where observers have little
time to think reflectively, the strong inclination is to construe data as normal rather
than abnormal.”149 Once the monitor interpreted his role broadly, his view may have
become entrenched despite the protestations of Apple. Indeed, Apple’s protests
created a particularly “noisy” environment that resulted in multiple appeals to the
Second Circuit and significant, critical news reports toward the monitor and district
court. Thus, Apple’s objections may have inadvertently served to entrench further
the view of the monitor, court, and government about the appropriateness of the
monitor’s actions, allowing the tendency of cognitive conservativism to take hold.
Therefore, the breakdowns associated with the Apple monitorship might properly
be characterized as, at least in part, being caused by the monitor, court, and
government’s failure to consider whether the monitor’s initial impression regarding
his scope of authority was correct. Instead of reflecting on the appropriate boundaries
and norms that should restrain a compliance actor engaged in a remediation effort,
the monitor’s initial impression became the status quo view. The confusion is
understandable in that remediation efforts may often bleed into prevention efforts,
but the failure to recognize that they are discrete and distinct stages may have
contributed to the conflicts between the parties in this case.
If, however, Apple had framed its objections utilizing the process frame outlined
in this Article or if the monitor, court, or government had been mindful that the
monitorship was meant to be part of a remediation effort, the conflicts created by the
monitor’s more expansive view of the appropriate boundaries for the monitorship
may have been more apparent. Instead of viewing Apple’s objections as the protests
of a recalcitrant bad actor, they may have been viewed as legitimate concerns
regarding the appropriate scope of authority for an individual engaged in a
remediation, as opposed to a prevention, effort. And instead of viewing his role
expansively, the monitor may have been more likely to restrict his actions to those
appropriate for a narrowly tailored remediation effort.

149. Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 87–88 (2002).
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B. Example 2: Unidentified Role Conversion
Promontory is “a leading strategy, risk management, and regulatory-compliance
consulting firm focusing on the financial services industry.”150 It “help[s] entities
understand and implement global and national financial services regulation.”151
Ironically, Promontory, a firm charged with assisting firms facing compliance
challenges, experienced its own compliance failure that resulted in significant
sanctions, including a $15 million penalty.152 As described by the New York State
Department of Financial Services, Promontory exercised “a lack of independent
judgment in the preparation and submission of certain reports.”153 When one
considers Promontory’s conduct under a compliance process frame, however, it
looks as if the failure was more complicated. The root cause of Promontory’s lack of
independent judgment appears related to its failure to identify a need to change the
parameters of its relationship when it went from assisting a bank with detection
efforts to assisting the bank and the regulator with a related investigation.
1. Promontory’s Misconduct
In 2009, Standard Chartered, a bank, hired Promontory to serve in what appeared
to be a role meant to assist the bank in detecting certain types of misconduct.154
Specifically, “Promontory contracted with the Bank’s counsel to provide ‘consulting
services in connection with the identification and collection of historical transaction
records relating to cross-border financial transactions.’”155 After Promontory
completed its review, Standard Chartered “reported to various regulators, including
the New York [Department of Financial Services] . . . that it had engaged in conduct
related to the evasion of U.S. sanctions.”156 It appears, therefore, that Promontory
properly assisted the bank in detecting instances of misconduct and the bank then,
again properly, reported the detected misconduct to the appropriate regulator.
In April 2010, Standard Chartered again engaged Promontory “to identify, collect
and review historical transaction records ‘with certain countries or certain Specially
Designated Nationals (“SDNs”) subject to sanctions’ administered by” the Office of
Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.157 “As part of the
engagement, Promontory produced a number of reports and made various
presentations to the Bank and government authorities . . . . These reports included

150. About Promontory, PROMONTORY, http://www.promontory.com/OurFirm.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3VD7-F55R].
151. Id.
152. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Promontory Financial Settles with New York
Regulator, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08
/19/business/dealbook/promontory-financial-settles-with-new-york-regulator.html [https://
perma.cc/58XR-9GLR].
153. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF PROMONTORY
FINANCIAL GROUP, LLC 1, 15 (2015) [hereinafter PROMONTORY REPORT].
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2–3.
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interim reports throughout 2010, final reports in January and March of 2011, and
updates to those final reports in October 2011.”158 This second engagement, known
as “Project Green,” involved efforts to investigate the full scope of the bank’s
misconduct and is where problems with Promontory’s conduct occurred.159
When Promontory took on the Project Green engagement, it held itself out to be
independent from Standard Chartered, and as part of the engagement, it provided
formal and regular reports to the New York Department of Financial Services. The
regulator, in turn, relied “upon the work conducted and presented by Promontory to
identify the scope of the Bank’s improper conduct and to determine an appropriate
resolution of the investigation.”160 Utilizing information from Promontory’s
investigation, the New York Department of Financial Services required Standard
Chartered to “pay a penalty of $340 million and to install an independent on-site
monitor, for a period of two years.”161 The newly engaged monitor, however,
uncovered additional misconduct at the bank, which (i) resulted in additional
sanctions for the bank and (ii) prompted an investigation into Promontory’s
actions.162
The investigation of Promontory’s conduct revealed that it did not, in fact,
maintain its independence from Standard Chartered.163 For example, Promontory
removed a portion of an interim report at the request of the bank after the bank
expressed concerns that the section “referred to conduct that regulators were not yet
aware of and might ‘draw questions which we’re not yet prepared to answer.’”164
Additionally, Promontory changed language in its reports at the request of Standard
Chartered in an effort to make the bank’s misconduct look less significant.165 These
facts, among others, led the New York Department of Financial Services to
determine that “Promontory exhibited a lack of independent judgment in the
preparation and submission of certain reports.”166 Ultimately, Promontory agreed to
voluntarily “abstain from certain consulting arrangements in New York for six
months” and to pay a $15 million penalty.167
2. Promontory’s Activities Under the Compliance Process Frame
While it certainly seems reasonable for the New York regulator to determine that
Promontory failed to exercise an appropriate level of independent judgment, that
determination does not attempt to uncover the root cause of Promontory’s
misconduct. When, however, Promontory’s conduct is evaluated against the process
frame outlined in Part II, a possible reason for its failure becomes apparent.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 6–7.
Protess & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 152.
PROMONTORY REPORT, supra note 153, at 6.
Id. at 1, 15.
Protess & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 152.
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When Promontory took on the 2009 engagement, it was charged with assisting
Standard Chartered in its efforts to detect potential misconduct. The 2010
engagement, Project Green, while distinct, likely looked to be a very similar set of
tasks. Even the descriptions of the two engagements appear quite similar. The
difference, however, is that when Promontory was engaged to assist in Standard
Chartered’s detection efforts, Promontory reported solely to the bank, but when it
shifted into an investigatory role, Promontory had a responsibility to provide
information to both Standard Chartered and the New York Department of Financial
Services. This shift changed Promontory’s ethical obligations.
The field of behavioral ethics, in part, addresses the “predictable situational and
social forces that can lead people to engage in unethical behavior.”168 In particular,
behavioral ethics research explains that an actor may know that a particular behavior
is wrong, but may be “unaware of the forces that are leading [him or her] to cross
ethical boundaries (intentional unethical behavior).”169 In the case of Promontory, the
individuals working on Project Green most likely “knew” that it was unethical or, at
the very least, a conflict of interest to take significant instruction from Standard
Chartered about what to include in independent reports to the New York regulator.
Yet they assented to making changes to their independent reports and thereby failed
to include relevant information to the regulator. The decision to take instruction from
Standard Chartered during the 2009 engagement would have been acceptable, but
the shift in its role as part of the 2010 Project Green engagement changed the calculus
by which Promontory employees should have evaluated their ethical duties and
responsibilities. Thus, Promontory employees and management may have failed to
identify the conversion of its role, which may have been a root cause of Promontory’s
failure to exercise appropriate independent judgment.
C. Example 3: Regulatory Design Failure
In November 2011, in response to the mortgage foreclosure crisis, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Federal Reserve”) and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) began what came to be known as the Independent
Foreclosure Review.170 The Independent Foreclosure Review “require[ed] a review by

168. Max H. Bazerman & Francesca Gino, Behavioral Ethics: Toward a Deeper
Understanding of Moral Judgment and Dishonesty, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 85, 91 (2012).
The field of behavioral ethics is rooted in behavioral decision theory and is related to many
concepts found in the field of behavioral economics. For example, behavioral economists often
discuss the idea of “bounded rationality” while a behavioral ethicist focuses on “bounded
ethicality.” See Dolly Chugh, Max H. Bazerman & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Bounded Ethicality
as a Psychological Barrier to Recognizing Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 74, 75–77
(Don A. Moore et al. eds., 2005).
169. Bazerman & Gino, supra note 168, at 91.
170. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
Independent Foreclosure Review Underway (Nov. 1, 2011), https://www.occ.gov
/news-issuances/news-releases/2011/nr-occ-2011-133.html [https://perma.cc/T6VG-36XG]
[hereinafter OCC Press Release]; Anna Cuevas, Independent Foreclosure Review: Is It the
Real Deal?, HUFFPOST (Nov. 22, 2011, 10:37 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anna
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an independent consultant to determine if errors or misrepresentations made by banks
might have caused financial harm to homeowners.”171 In particular, the reviews were
targeted at identifying improper foreclosure practices with a goal of providing
financial compensation to those harmed. The Independent Foreclosure Review,
however, failed in stunning fashion. Two common rationales for the failure of the
review are (i) that conflicts of interest existed among the independent consultants
engaged to complete the review and (ii) that the Federal Reserve and OCC failed to
properly supervise the reviews. But, yet again, when one utilizes this Article’s
process frame to evaluate the compliance failure, it looks as if the root cause may be
more complicated and related to the expansive nature of the review, which required
consultants to engage in an unprecedented effort of detection, investigation, and
remediation.
1. The Failed Independent Foreclosure Review
In April 2011, in response to the mortgage foreclosure crisis, enforcement actions
were brought by the OCC, the Federal Reserve, and the Office of Thrift Supervision
against fourteen mortgage servicers, which required them “to correct deficiencies in
their servicing and foreclosure processes.”172 Specifically, each of the mortgage
servicers was required to engage independent consultants “to conduct a multi-faceted
independent review of foreclosure actions that occurred in 2009 and 2010.”173
To effectuate this review, each of the independent consultants developed a set of
questions utilized to evaluate conduct at the specific bank whose policies the
consultant was charged with overseeing.174 The questions allowed the independent
consultants to “evaluat[e] whether borrowers suffered financial injury through errors,
misrepresentations, or other deficiencies in foreclosure practices and determin[e]
appropriate remediation for those customers.”175 Additionally, the independent
consultants were charged with “review[ing] a variety of sample cases from each
servicer.”176 In the event an issue was identified, the independent consultant was
required to “conduct additional secondary reviews to identify as many affected
borrowers as possible.”177 In instances where a “borrower suffered financial injury
as a result of” a mortgage servicer’s conduct, “the consent orders require[d]
remediation to be provided.”178
When the reviews commenced in November 2011, the acting head of the OCC
said that the reviews would “take several months to complete, considering the large

-cuevas/foreclosure-review_b_1098840.html [https://perma.cc/9ANM-AT8L].
171. Cuevas, supra note 170.
172. OCC Press Release, supra note 170.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Ben Hallman & Eleazar David Melendez, Foreclosure Review Insiders
Portray Massive Failure, Doomed from the Start, HUFFPOST (Jan. 14, 2013, 9:23 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/14/foreclosure-review-failure-start_n_2468988.html
[https://perma.cc/W8HN-JUPF].
175. OCC Press Release, supra note 170.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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pool of borrowers that could be part of the review.”179 Over a year later, however,
the review ended in an abrupt fashion once it became clear that it was “doomed.”180
The individual file reviews for various homeowners were halted in favor of a new
deal, which allowed any homeowner who received a foreclosure notice in 2009 or
2010—over four million people—to receive some share of a fixed, multibillion
amount of money ranging from $250 to $125,000.181 At the time the reviews ceased,
over $1.5 billion had been paid to the independent consultants and their employees
or agents for the failed review.182
The failure of the Independent Foreclosure Review, unsurprisingly, sparked
criticism from the public at large183 and drew the ire of congressional members.184 It
also resulted in multiple investigations by the Government Accountability Office,
which determined that the OCC and Federal Reserve (i) needed to enhance borrower
outreach efforts,185 (ii) should have improved oversight of the reviews,186 and (iii)
should have done more to define testing activities aimed at overseeing the foreclosure
reviews.187 In the weeks and months that followed, multiple accounts emerged
blaming the review’s failure on a variety of causes, including flawed guidance from
the regulators188 and inherent conflicts of interest by the independent consultants.189

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Hallman & Melendez, supra note 174.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See Independent Foreclosure Review, U.S. HOUSE COMM. ON FIN. SERVS.
DEMOCRATS, https://democrats-financialservices.house.gov/news/documentquery.aspx?Issue
ID=126815 [https://perma.cc/7H8V-BQ9Y].
185. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-776, FORECLOSURE REVIEW:
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO FURTHER ENHANCE BORROWER OUTREACH EFFORTS (2012),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592059.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7L8-UQA3].
186. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-277, FORECLOSURE REVIEW: LESSONS
LEARNED COULD ENHANCE CONTINUING REVIEWS AND ACTIVITIES UNDER AMENDED CONSENT
ORDERS (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653327.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3HN-UF5D].
187. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-376, FORECLOSURE REVIEW:
REGULATORS COULD STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT AND IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY OF THE PROCESS
(2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662791.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TWX-EWMC].
188. Hallman & Melendez, supra note 174; see also Alexis Golstein, Foreclosure Review
Report Shows that the OCC Continues to Bury Wall Street’s Bodies, NATION (Apr. 10, 2013),
https://www.thenation.com/article/foreclosure-review-report-shows-occ-continues-bury
-wall-streets-bodies [https://perma.cc/R83Z-HRCL]; Francine McKenna, GAO Blames
Regulators for Faulty Foreclosure Reviews but That’s Not the Whole Story, FORBES (Apr. 4,
2013, 8:13 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/francinemckenna/2013/04/04/gao-blames
-regulators-for-faulty-foreclosure-reviews-but-thats-not-the-whole-story/#6bb50fac5407
[https://perma.cc/2JC7-G8JA].
189. Francine
McKenna,
Another
Conflicted
Foreclosure
Review:
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ally/Res Cap, FORBES (June 25, 2013, 2:40 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/francinemckenna/2013/06/25/another-conflicted-foreclosure-review
-pricewaterhousecoopers-and-allyrescap/#657380eb4907 [https://perma.cc/BL9U-QQWB];
John E. Miller, There’s a Big Conflict of Interest in the National Foreclosure Review Process,
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 6, 2012, 8:23 AM), http://static5.businessinsider.com/more-info-revealed
-about-the-foreclosure-review-process--and-some-dont-like-it-2012-3
[https://perma.cc
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And yet, when considered under the compliance process frame, another potential root
cause comes to light.
2. The Independent Foreclosure Review Under the
Compliance Process Frame
A variety of missteps led to the ineffectiveness of the Independent Foreclosure
Review, but when one engages in root-cause analysis while utilizing the compliance
process frame, a pragmatic limitation is revealed. The independent consultants were
expected to conduct individualized reviews for over four million homeowners in an
effort to detect, investigate, and remediate claims of improper foreclosure
practices.190 The detection and investigation mechanisms required by the various
consent orders prompted independent consultants to draft an extraordinarily large
—in one case 2,000—set of questions for the independent consultant reviewers to
utilize in determining whether the banks followed their own internal policies and
practices for each individual homeowner.191 When one considers the sheer magnitude
of the project, particularly in light of the responsibility of the independent consultants
to engage in three stages of the compliance process for over four million
homeowners, one begins to question whether the expectations at the outset of the
review were realistic. Regulators were concerned with ensuring that the monetary
remediation received by homeowners was accurate, but in the process, they crafted
a highly burdensome review that required the consultants to do much more than
simply oversee the monetary remediation efforts. Therefore, it may be that a root
cause of the Independent Foreclosure Review’s failure was a result of a failed
regulatory design at the outset of the engagement.
D. Example 4: Lack of Commitment to Compliance
Baylor University (“Baylor”), a private Christian university located in Waco,
Texas, is “a [n]ationally [r]anked [r]esearch [i]nstitution” that “provides a vibrant
campus community for more than 16,000 students.”192 Baylor describes itself as “a
place where the Lordship of Jesus Christ is embraced, studied, and celebrated . . .
[that is] compelled to care for one another and to address the challenges of [a] hurting
world.”193 Baylor, however, failed to address allegations and incidents of sexual
assault within its student body for several years.194 Baylor’s failure to live up to its

/8BZK-BBWP].
190. Hallman & Melendez, supra note 174.
191. Id.
192. About Baylor, BAYLOR U., http://www.baylor.edu/about/?_buref=1172-91940
[https://perma.cc/24EZ-CF9Z].
193. Pro Futuris: A Strategic Vision for Baylor University, BAYLOR U.,
http://www.baylor.edu/profuturis [https://perma.cc/XG5K-RJF8].
194. See Paula Lavigne, Baylor Faces Accusations of Ignoring Sex Assault Victims, ESPN
(July 13, 2017), http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/14675790/baylor-officials-accused
-failing-investigate-sexual-assaults-fully-adequately-providing-support-alleged-victims
[https://perma.cc/HFQ5-ZXHB]; The 8 Biggest Recent Revelations in Baylor’s Sexual Assault
Scandal, SPORTSDAY (May 2017), https://sportsday.dallasnews.com/college-sports/college
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own stated values and those required of it by the Department of Education has a
variety of causes. One of the primary causes pointed to is the deficiencies within
Baylor’s Title IX compliance program.195 While it is correct that a failure by Baylor
to implement an effective Title IX compliance program was a significant cause of its
sexual assault scandal, careful study demonstrates that the compliance process at
Baylor was deficient at each and every step. Thus, Baylor’s sexual assault scandal
was not just a result of an ineffective compliance program. Instead, it appears to
reflect a lack of commitment by Baylor to create, implement, or prioritize a Title IX
compliance program.
1. Baylor’s Failed Compliance Process
Baylor’s failure to prevent Title IX violations was significant. First, Baylor did
not develop a formal Title IX program,196 despite guidance provided to schools by
the Department of Education in 2011.197 Second, “[p]rior to the 2014-2015 academic
year, Baylor failed to provide training and education to students [and] failed to
identify and train responsible employees under Title IX.”198
Baylor also neglected to properly detect Title IX violations. For example, Baylor
did not “provide clear information about reporting options and resources on

sports/2017/05/24/5-biggest-recent-revelations-baylors-sexual-assault-scandal [https://perma
.cc/WZ8F-6L9L].
195. Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in education programs and activities and, among
other things, dictates how educational institutions that receive federal funding must respond
to allegations of sexual assault. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.8(a) (2014); see also Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office
for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Colleagues (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed
.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9WWY-RASR]
[hereinafter Sexual Assault Dear Colleague Letter]; Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon,
Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Colleagues
(Apr. 24, 2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201504-title-ixcoordinators.pdf [https://perma.cc/69EV-EM9P]. The Department of Education provides
colleges and universities with guidance regarding their regulatory and legal requirements,
which for many schools provides the basis for their Title IX compliance programs. Much of
the reporting regarding Baylor’s sexual assault scandal has focused on its failure to adhere to
the Department of Education’s guidance regarding the creation and implementation of an
effective Title IX compliance program. See, e.g., Nancy Armour, Former Title IX Officer
Accuses Baylor of Discrimination, Intimidation, USA TODAY (Jan. 19, 2017, 1:55 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/big12/2017/01/19/former-title-9-officer
-gabrielle-lyons-accuses-baylor-discrimination-intimidation/96779182
[https://perma.cc
/U67Y-TBCS]. Indeed, an independent and external review conducted by an outside law firm,
Pepper Hamilton LLP, “reflect[ed] a fundamental failure by Baylor to implement Title IX.”
BAYLOR UNIVERSITY BOARD OF REGENTS: FINDINGS OF FACT, BAYLOR U. 1 (2016),
https://www.baylor.edu/thefacts/doc.php/266596.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HFE7-SQNN]
[hereinafter PH FINDINGS]. Specifically, “Baylor’s efforts to implement Title IX were slow,
ad hoc, and hindered by a lack of institutional support and engagement by senior leadership.”
Id.
196. PH FINDINGS, supra note 195, at 4.
197. Sexual Assault Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 195.
198. PH FINDINGS, supra note 195, at 4.
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campus.”199 Additionally, Baylor “failed to have a centralized process for ensuring
that all reports reached the Title IX Coordinator.”200 As a result, some reporting went
directly to athletic department staff, who were not trained in Title IX compliance and
failed to refer several Title IX violations to appropriate individuals within the
university.201
The claims of sexual assault that were referred to the appropriate office at the
time, the university’s judicial affairs office, were not properly investigated by Baylor
staff. For example, Baylor “failed to appropriately evaluate and balance institutional
safety and Title IX obligations against a complainant’s request for anonymity or that
no action/investigation be pursued.”202 Additionally, Baylor “failed to conduct
prompt, equitable, adequate, and reliable investigations.”203 Moreover, Baylor
administrators charged with investigating claims of sexual assault “were not
adequately trained in the dynamics of sexual and gender-based harassment and
violence, dating violence, domestic violence, stalking, [and] the neurobiological
impacts of trauma.”204
Baylor’s failures to prevent, detect, and properly investigate claims of sexual
misconduct became a high-profile scandal in January 2014, when a former football
player was found guilty of sexually assaulting a former Baylor student and sentenced
to twenty years in prison.205
Baylor did eventually engage in what appeared to be a sincere attempt to address
its past compliance failures. In November 2014, it hired its first full-time Title IX
coordinator who was charged with building and strengthening the Title IX office.206
In August 2015, it conducted an internal inquiry into how it handled sexual assault
allegations.207 And in September 2015, it hired external counsel to conduct an
“investigation into how the university handle[d] cases of alleged sexual violence,”
which resulted in 105 recommendations for the university to implement.208 In June
2016, the university’s interim president expressed Baylor’s commitment to
implement the recommendations, explaining that he “consider[ed] them to be
mandates” that must be adopted “so this will not happen again.”209
And yet, Baylor’s initial remediation efforts appear unsuccessful. The individual
hired in October 2014 to run its new Title IX office eventually resigned in October

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Mark Schlabach, Art Briles, Ian McCaw Failed to Report Allegations of 2012 Sexual
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2016, citing an inability to perform her job due to “resistance . . . from senior
leadership.”210 In particular, she claimed to have “never had the authority, resources
or independence to do her job.”211 She went so far as to file a formal complaint with
the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights, as did another staff
member of the Title IX office.212 Baylor’s efforts to address the misconduct that
occurred within its organization and improve its Title IX compliance are ongoing,
and only time will tell their relative success or failure.
2. The Baylor Scandal Under the Compliance Process Frame
Thus, Baylor engaged in long-term resistance to creating and implementing a Title
IX compliance program despite clear regulatory guidance from the Department of
Education and signals from its community about the need for an effective Title IX
compliance program. This insight may have been helpful for those responsible for
implementing a compliance program at Baylor, and it may also have important
takeaways for organizations responsible for regulating Baylor’s conduct.
It is possible that Baylor employees, students, and other members were suffering
from what cognitive psychologists refer to as the “halo effect.” The halo effect is a
cognitive bias “in which one’s judgment of a person’s character can be influenced
by one’s overall (and usually first) impression of him or her, with little actual
knowledge of the individual.”213 While initially a tool used for individuals, the halo
effect has been documented to influence how businesses are viewed. For example,
recent economics scholarship determined that when a business is perceived as
socially responsible, the company received an average of $2 million less in fines after
being found to have committed an FCPA violation, even though social responsibility
and foreign bribery are uncorrelated.214
As relevant to Baylor, it may be that individuals’ positive impressions of the
school made it difficult for them to recognize that it was failing in a profound way to
develop and maintain an effective Title IX compliance program. Indeed, the halo
effect may have impacted the ability of individuals to conceive of Baylor having a
problem with sexual assault on its campus at all. If, however, individuals at Baylor
had utilized a process frame to evaluate its missteps prior to engaging in its initial
remediation effort, they may have realized the depth of the institutional deficiencies
in the Title IX space and been more receptive to the requests of the initial Title IX
director.
Additionally, the compliance frame may be helpful for regulators tasked with
assessing the progress a regulated entity is making toward meeting certain
compliance requirements. For example, a regulator assessing Baylor’s commitment
to Title IX may have initially believed it could take a relatively hands-off approach
and allow Baylor to initiate a compliance program without robust oversight. When,

210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Harrison Hong & Inessa Liskovich, Crime, Punishment and the Halo Effect of
Corporate Social Responsibility 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
21215, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21215.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HFK-AGCH].
214. See id. at 16–20.
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however, one utilizes a process frame and determines the extent of Baylor’s
shortcomings in the Title IX area, it may prompt the regulator to engage in more
aggressive actions in an effort to ensure Baylor implements the reforms necessary to
create and maintain a compliance program that is likely to be successful.
Thus, the root cause of Baylor’s compliance failure—a lack of commitment to a
Title IX compliance program—might more readily be identified when a compliance
frame is utilized. A lack of commitment is an extremely high hurdle to clear for those
charged with implementing a compliance program, but recognizing the lack of
commitment may be the key insight needed to develop a strategy that can begin to
overcome the related cultural resistance to long-term organizational change.
****
To be sure, the predictive value of these examples is necessarily limited. The
benefit of full and complete information about the compliance outcomes outlined in
this Part was not available to those charged with constructing these efforts, which
means an element of hindsight bias is likely present in these accounts. The potential
power of the process frame suggested by this Article will need to be utilized before
any final determinations can be made with regard to its usefulness. Despite this
limitation, the process frame does provide a new tool of assessment that leads to an
alternative, or additional, determination regarding the root cause of some relatively
significant compliance failures. As such, at a minimum the compliance frame
presented in Part II of this Article may assist in more fully understanding the nature
and scope of certain compliance failures.
IV. BENEFITS & POTENTIAL CONCERNS
This Article seeks to provide a new method for evaluating compliance failures.
This Part addresses some, although certainly not all, of the potential benefits of this
Article’s proposed framework. The Part then addresses some potential concerns
raised by the arguments herein.
A. Benefits
If those charged with creating and modifying compliance programs were to utilize
the compliance process outlined in this Article when attempting to determine the root
cause of the failure before them, a variety of benefits would follow. This Part
addresses a few such benefits. It begins by discussing how the process frame may
assist in narrowing the potential cause or causes of systematic compliance failures.
The Part goes on to explain how the process frame can be utilized for institutional
design efforts. It then explains how the process frame—an intervention made
primarily for the benefit of those within organizations responsible for developing and
assessing compliance failures—might also be useful for governmental actors charged
with incentivizing effective ethics and compliance programs within organizations.
The Part next explains how the process frame helps to support the establishment of
compliance as a discrete field of study. It continues by identifying the ways in which
the Article’s proposal might improve assessments of conflicts of interest. It
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concludes by discussing how a process frame may bolster notions of procedural
fairness within firms engaged in creating and modifying their compliance programs.
1. Assist in Narrowing the Cause of Systemic Compliance Failures
In an earlier article, I criticized the government’s current enforcement strategy,
because it focuses on particular compliance areas, like Title IX or the FCPA, instead
of considering whether there is a larger, more sophisticated failure within a firm’s
compliance program.215 My previous study, for example, demonstrated that HewlettPackard entities engaged in improper bribery that violated the laws of three different
statutory regimes.216 One problem with a segmented enforcement strategy is that it
fails to incentivize firms to systematically assess the effectiveness of their
compliance efforts. This Article’s proposed framework, however, might be helpful
to firms that would like to undertake more holistic assessments of their compliance
programs. A firm may be able to utilize the Article’s proposed framework to engage
in its own independent assessment of whether similar types of misconduct within the
firm should prompt changes within its broader compliance efforts. Specifically, the
framework may assist firms in their efforts to determine whether multiple
compliance failures occurred in the same stage of the compliance process. If all of
the failures occurred in one stage, like the prevention stage, it might serve as evidence
of a need for the company to revamp its policies and procedures surrounding
prevention in a broad and systematic manner.
2. Utilized in Institutional Design Efforts
The process frame outlined in this Article is primarily put forth to assist
compliance actors in their attempts to determine the root cause of compliance
failures. The process frame can also, however, be utilized in institutional design
efforts. Once compliance actors have used the process frame to determine the root
cause or causes of a compliance failure, they can then use the information gleaned to
make tangible changes to the organization’s compliance program. For instance, a
company could determine how it should best allocate resources among the four
stages. It may be that a firm decides it is overspending on the prevention stage and
should allocate more resources toward detection. Currently, the Organizational
Guidelines emphasize prevention and detection, so one often sees firms spend a great
deal of time on those two stages within the compliance process, but an assessment
that relies upon the compliance process frame may reveal deficiencies with a firm’s
investigative function. Additionally, utilizing a process frame may make it easier to
break out tasks in manageable components and determine what work has and has not
been completed. Because firms often employ both in-house and external actors to
assist them in their compliance programs, it may be helpful to definitively assign
responsibility for different stages within the compliance process to particular
departments or external attorneys, auditors, or consultants. To the extent that both inhouse and external actors engaged in duplicative work, using the process frame may

215. See Root, supra note 35, at 1029–36.
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also assist in efforts to compare and evaluate what was and was not done by the
internal and external actors and identify where the two sets of actors’ results
diverged.
3. Provide Regulators with an Additional Tool for
Evaluating Compliance Failures
The primary purpose of this Article is to provide those charged with creating and
implementing compliance programs with another tool for assessing compliance
failures. Internal compliance officers are often in the best position to determine the
root cause of compliance failures and challenges within their particular organization
because they are aware of the most significant risks their organizations face.
This Article’s proposed compliance process frame might be equally useful to
regulators and prosecutors engaged in investigations of organizational misconduct.
Government enforcement agents are charged with determining appropriate sanctions
and remedial actions for organizations that fail to comply with legal and regulatory
mandates, which require an assessment regarding the nature and scope of the
wrongdoing. For misconduct that looks pervasive, a government enforcement agent
may be more likely to issue a significant sanction. For misconduct that looks like an
aberration, the government enforcement agent may want to decline to impose a
penalty altogether. When making these sorts of distinctions, it may be helpful for
regulators and prosecutors to assess whether the compliance failure at an
organization involved one or multiple stages within the compliance process.
Additionally, knowing what stage in the compliance process misconduct occurred
might assist them in crafting certain remedial actions and consequences.
The upshot is that regulators and prosecutors, not just industry leaders and
compliance personnel, might also benefit from utilizing the compliance process
frame to assess compliance failures.
4. Identifies Compliance as a Discrete Field of Study
The examples used in this Article encompass a diverse set of regulatory and legal
requirements and include organizations of differing corporate forms when discussing
compliance failures. The field of compliance is an emerging one within legal
scholarship, but the diversity of issues raised by compliance may make some wonder
whether it truly is its own field. One additional benefit of this Article’s proposed
framework is that it assists in the effort to identify common concepts and
characteristics that are found throughout the field of compliance. Whether the
compliance program is targeted toward bribery, sexual assault, product liability, or
consumer protection, all compliance programs must consider how they can prevent
misconduct, detect when wrongdoing occurs, investigate the scope of the
misconduct, and determine the best steps for remediating the malfeasance within the
organization. The stability of the compliance process helps identify seemingly
divergent areas into a cognizable field of study.
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5. Improved Ability to Assess Potential Conflicts of
Interest Within the Compliance Process
One common concern presented by compliance failures is the role that conflicts
of interest play in the underlying misconduct. Two of the four examples outlined in
Part III of this Article have what appear to be conflict of interest stories.
For example, Promontory was allowed to assist Standard Chartered in its
investigation after already being engaged in a detection effort. Promontory may have
developed a strong sense of loyalty to Standard Chartered, or it may have been
suffering from capture217 as a result of its prior relationship. Additionally,
Promontory may have hoped to continue its relationship with Standard Chartered at
the conclusion of Project Green, the investigative engagement, particularly given the
highly lucrative nature of the project to Promontory, which earned $54.5 million in
total revenue from its work on Project Green.218 Similarly, multiple conflicts of
interest were detected as part of the Independent Foreclosure Review, as many of the
independent consultants had prior auditing relationships with the mortgage servicers
they were assigned to oversee.219
Interestingly, these conflicts of interest should have been apparent to the relevant
regulators in each of these examples. The conflicts were not secret and the prior
relationships were subject to public reporting. And yet, the regulators failed to (i)
appreciate the existence of the conflict of interest or (ii) properly assess the potential
importance of the conflict.
The existence of a conflict of interest does not necessarily mean that a person or
entity should be barred from assisting a firm or organization in future compliance
efforts. Indeed, prior familiarity with a certain company or industry might actually
result in certain efficiencies, improved working relationships, or more optimal
compliance recommendations. But potential conflicts of interest should be evaluated
fully and completely, and one potential benefit to this Article’s proposed framework
is that it might assist in those efforts by making certain distinctions—like a
conversion of an external compliance consultant’s role in a manner that creates
conflicts of interest—more apparent.
6. Bolster Notions of Procedural Fairness
One challenge for individuals charged with creating, implementing, and
maintaining compliance programs is finding ways to get employees and other
members within the organization to comply with the actual compliance program.
Research from the field of social psychology has determined an essential component

217. “‘Capture refers to an extremely close relationship between regulators and industry.’
And while not all scholars believe that capture is problematic, it is accepted that capture could
lead to ‘sympathy to industry (implying excessive sympathy), identification with industry’s
interest, and (unduly) lax enforcement.’” Veronica Root, The Monitor-“Client” Relationship,
100 VA. L. REV. 523, 579 (2014) (footnotes omitted).
218. PROMONTORY REPORT, supra note 153, at 3 n.1.
219. McKenna, supra note 189.
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of shaping the behavior of individuals lies in the perceived fairness of the processes
authorities use.220
For example, “[p]eople think that decisions are being more fairly made when
authorities are neutral and unbiased and make their decisions using objective
indicators, not their personal views.”221 By purposefully and publicly utilizing the
compliance process frame when assessing compliance failures, individuals charged
with making changes to compliance programs may more readily demonstrate that
they have engaged in an unbiased, deliberative process. Using the compliance frame
as a tool may encourage organizational employees and members to perceive the
resulting changes in policies and procedures as the legitimate conclusion of a fair
assessment process. And if the modifications to the compliance program are
perceived as fair, it is more likely that the organization’s members and employees
will adhere to the parameters of the program.
B. Potential Concerns
Despite the many benefits to this Article’s proposed framework, there are some
potential concerns raised by this Article and the proposed framework. This Section
begins by discussing whether this Article’s proposal will potentially create “paper”
compliance programs instead of encouraging “cultures of compliance.” The Section
next discusses whether the process frame suggested by this Article is a genuinely
new idea within compliance scholarship. It then addresses whether the Article’s
proposal would be equally applicable to internal and external compliance actors. The
Section goes on to assess whether there is an appreciable distinction between the
Article’s use of “prevention” and more classic discussions regarding the role of
gatekeepers. Finally, the Section discusses the roles of information disclosure and
adjudication within the four stages of the compliance process.
1. Paper Programs Versus Cultures of Compliance
One common refrain within compliance circles is a concern that organizations
will engage in so-called “paper compliance.” Paper compliance refers to the
development of a compliance program on paper that is ineffectual in practice.222 The
concerns about paper compliance often dovetail into discussions about how an
organization can create a culture of compliance. Recent legal scholarship has
recognized that “[c]ulture becomes especially important . . . when . . . the structural
aspects of compliance and supervision cannot or do not otherwise influence

220. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30
CRIME & JUST. 283, 284–85 (2003). The research conducted by Tyler and the scenarios
presented in this Article do not track perfectly. He is focused on formal adjudication, which is
not the focus of the compliance process. That said, the notion of procedural fairness does
analogize well to this situation where significant consequences are levied when misconduct
occurs—whether the consequences are imposed by internal or external firm actors.
221. Id. at 298.
222. Tom Fox, What Is a Paper Compliance Program?, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Dec. 29,
2016),
https://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/the-man-from-fcpa/what-is-a-paper
-compliance-program#.WniEWudG13g [https://perma.cc/6A7D-4WX3].
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behavior.”223 Thus, one major question raised by this Article’s proposed framework
is whether it is likely to (i) contribute to the undesirable creation of paper compliance
programs or (ii) promote more effective cultures of compliance.
In regard to the first question, the Article’s proposed framework is meant to
combat “paper compliance” programs by providing a new tool for assessing the root
cause of compliance failures. By changing the inquiry from the broad question of
“why did the compliance program fail” to the more precise inquiry of “where within
the compliance process did misconduct occur,” this Article’s proposal is aimed at
improving assessments of corporate misconduct. When assessments more clearly
identify the root causes of organizational malfeasance, it will make it more difficult
for firms to employ ineffective remediation efforts. That is not to say that it would
be impossible for a firm to attempt to utilize the process frame in a surface way, but
essentially all methods of reform are vulnerable to manipulation by sufficiently
motivated bad actors. That possibility is not a reason to abandon the intervention.
In regard to the second question, it appears unlikely that the compliance process
frame on its own would encourage a firm committed to noncompliance to make
meaningful change toward a more compliant culture. “Culture of compliance refers
to the shared beliefs—‘sense-making’—inside any given organization about the
importance or legitimacy of legal compliance vis-à-vis other pressures and goals.”224
The compliance process frame will not, on its own, change the shared beliefs within
a firm with a defunct compliance culture. It may, however, serve to expose the extent
of the deficiencies within an organization’s culture. And that exposure may create a
set of incentives—whether from regulatory action or public pressure—to change the
culture within the organization.
2. The Four Stages of the Compliance Process Are Already
Recognized as Important to Compliance Efforts
As outlined in Part II, each stage of the proposed compliance process frame has
been recognized as important by previous scholarship, courts, or regulatory
mechanisms. Thus, a question may exist as to whether this Article’s attempted
intervention is providing a genuinely new framework for assessing compliance
failures. For example, a recent article explained:
The common structural framework for compliance includes (1) a
commitment from senior leadership to the task, setting a right “tone at
the top;” (2) delegation of authority to officials with distinct compliance
responsibilities and the resources to do their task; (3) firm-wide
education and training about both the substance and process of
compliance; (4) informational mechanisms to alert as to suspicious
activity (e.g., whistleblowing procedures); (5) audit and surveillance
tactics to detect compliance failures or risks; and (6) internal
investigation, response, discipline and remediation so as to learn and
adjust when failures occur. The right mix of these is firm-specific, a

223. Langevoort, supra note 34, at 944.
224. Id. (footnote omitted).
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customization that recognizes the great range of motives, opportunities,
and types of violations most likely to be a problem at a given firm.225
The concepts of prevention, detection, investigation, and remediation are present in
this description, which means individuals charged with assessing compliance failures
are likely aware of the importance of these concepts.
This Article is not arguing that it is inventing new methods for assessing
compliance failures. Instead, it has (i) evaluated compliance failures across a wide
variety of legal and regulatory areas, (ii) determined that within that diversity there
are four stages that those charged with overseeing compliance efforts must consider
or address, and (iii) suggested that these four common aspects within the compliance
process can be utilized to frame inquiries surrounding the root cause of compliance
failures.
Because the method by which one frames a question can affect the answers one
is able to identify, this Article’s suggestion to purposefully utilize these four
components of the compliance process when undergoing and assessing compliance
efforts does allow these previously recognized concepts to serve a new purpose. The
current approach to addressing compliance failures has tended to focus on why or
how compliance failures occurred, which allowed for concrete answers. The question
did not, however, prompt or force institutions to consider the full complexity of their
compliance breakdowns. The hope is that this Article’s proposal will encourage a
more robust inquiry and corresponding root-cause analysis into the causes of
corporate misconduct and potential avenues for corrective action.
3. Internal Compliance Assessments
The first three examples given in Part III involved external individuals charged
with addressing compliance challenges or failures within a separate organization or
firm, and the fourth involved a very public compliance failure. This may prompt one
to wonder about the salience of this Article’s proposed framework when dealing with
purely internal compliance assessments.
Because the proposal outlined in this Article will need to be utilized and tested
before its potential effectiveness can be fully and properly assessed, it is difficult to
say definitively how the proposal may function when utilized by internal compliance
personnel to engage in confidential assessments. The use of external and public
examples in Part III was motivated by an attempt to utilize well-known examples
that had been heavily reported on in public spaces, so that the Article’s claims would
remain accessible to a wide audience of readers. Internal compliance failures and
challenges often remain just that, internal, which makes it more challenging to garner
examples that can be shared in a public forum. That said, the hope is that this
Article’s proposal will be considered for use by those within industry.

225. Id. at 939–40 (footnotes omitted).
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4. The Propriety of Utilizing the Same Framework for
Public Firms and Nonprofit Organizations
The examples in this Article include both public firms, like Apple, and nonprofit
organizations, like Baylor.226 It is often the case in legal scholarship that the
public/nonprofit divide is inappropriate to cross, and a question remains about the
propriety of utilizing the same process frame for evaluating misconduct in different
types of organizations.
While it is certainly true that different organizations often face distinct challenges
and difficulties, at its core the task of identifying the root cause of misconduct within
firms and organizations remains the same, or basically the same, inquiry. This
Article’s proposed framework is aimed at assisting industry leaders, policymakers,
and academics in determining why misconduct occurred, but the strategies
implemented for resolving the misconduct might differ widely based on the type of
organization where the wrongdoing occurred. For example, in another article, I
proposed a more aggressive enforcement regime for corporate repeat offenders, but
the proposed solutions were only applicable for public companies.227 More research
is certainly needed regarding the different compliance challenges facing public firms
and nonprofit organizations, but as of now it does appear that conducting a root-cause
analysis may be a similar task regardless of corporate form.
5. Whether There Is a Relevant Distinction Between This Article’s
Use of “Prevention” and the Classic “Gatekeeper”
This Article suggests that the first stage in the compliance process is one of
prevention. Gatekeepers are often characterized as actors who are charged with
preventing misconduct within firms. The tie between the concepts of gatekeeping
and prevention is strong, which raises a question as to whether this Article’s use of
“prevention” is meant to include the role of gatekeepers or is a purposeful attempt to
exclude gatekeepers from its typology.
For example, in discussing misconduct committed by senior officers of a firm,
legal scholarship explains that “preventive measure[s] establish[] an internal gate and
gatekeeper that can bar misconduct, either literally or figuratively, unless the wouldbe wrongdoer invests resources and skill in circumventing it.”228 Similarly, when
discussing the proper role of the corporate attorney, one potential role is known as
“the gatekeeper model,” which “may require the attorney to take affirmative steps to
prevent or limit client wrongdoing.”229 Thus, the ideas of prevention and gatekeeping
often appear together. Moreover, discussions of compliance often talk about the role
of the gatekeeper, which makes its omission from this Article’s framework
potentially concerning. For example, the leading compliance casebook describes a
gatekeeper as “someone who guards a gate. The ‘gate’ in this metaphor separates the
organization from some objective that the organization seeks to achieve. The
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250

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 94:203

gatekeeper has control over the gate, and accordingly can prevent or impede the
organization from achieving its objective.”230
It is certainly true that gatekeepers are quite important to compliance efforts. This
Article’s dependence on the word prevention, however, is done to ensure clarity of
meaning and thought. As has been noted, “[t]he term ‘gatekeeper’ is widely used in
compliance circles, but the specific meaning is not always precise.”231 There are
competing definitions of gatekeepers throughout legal scholarship, with some
emphasizing service providers232 and others focusing on a type of liability.233 Because
of the ongoing debate about what is and is not a gatekeeper, this Article’s framework
has deliberately avoided the term.
6. The Role of Information Disclosure
Recent scholarship has explained that “the compliance function attends to the
flow of information within [an] organization.”234 As such, one may wonder why this
Article’s proposed framework does not discuss the role of information disclosure.
Across all four stages of the compliance process, there are a variety of functions that
individuals engaged in compliance efforts undertake. One of those functions is to
provide information from one part of the organization to another. For example, the
compliance department may be responsible for training lower-level employees while
also responsible for reporting misconduct to senior management. The information
disclosure function is present and necessary at each stage of the compliance process.
Because information disclosure is a function of compliance efforts and not a distinct
stage within the compliance process, a robust discussion of information disclosure is
not necessary for understanding this Article’s proposed framework. It is, however,
an essential component of an effective compliance program.
7. The Role of Adjudication Within the Process Frame
As outlined, this Article does not address formal and informal adjudicative
decisions and where they would fit within the compliance process framework.
Formal adjudication may consist of a decision from a court, regulatory body, or selfregulatory organization, while informal adjudication may include a decision by an
organization that one of its employees or agents engaged in misconduct. Adjudicative
decisions—both formal and informal—are important because they allow a firm to
understand that misconduct did in fact occur. They can occur, however, at the
detection, investigation, and remediation stages. It may be that a company detects
misconduct and immediately understands and interprets the relevant actions as
misconduct. In other instances, a firm may detect potential misconduct, but the
formal finding of misconduct is not confirmed until after an investigative period.
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This is important because it is possible to initiate an investigation and determine that
a compliance failure did not in fact occur. Finally, a remediation effort into corporate
misconduct will sometimes uncover other instances of wrongdoing within the
organization. This insight cements the importance of firms fully engaging and
investing in each stage of the compliance process, so that informal and formal
adjudicative decisions are made properly.
CONCLUSION
As is detailed above, there are a number of reasons and incentives for firms and
organizations to comply with legal and regulatory requirements, but compliance
failures persist. This Article is the second in a series of articles aimed at improving
compliance programs, and this particular Article makes three primary contributions
to legal scholarship.
First, it demonstrates that compliance failures can be analyzed using a process
frame based on the four stages of prevention, detection, investigation, and
remediation. Currently, academics, regulators, industry professionals, and the public
often focus broadly on the “compliance failure,” but this Article shifts the framing
of the inquiry presented in a manner that forces compliance actors to be more
deliberative and focused when making assessments.
Second, the Article argues that utilizing a process frame may in many instances
lead to a new or additional root-cause determination when evaluating compliance
failures. Currently, when compliance failures occur, compliance actors often focus
on the immediate misconduct or wrongdoing without systematically assessing
whether there might have been multiple failures or contributing causes. As a result,
those charged with overseeing remediation efforts at firms may not fully appreciate
the scope of work that needs to be undertaken. This Article’s framework will assist
in efforts to hone in on the root cause of compliance failures. This assistance holds
even when an organization is not fully committed to creating an effective compliance
program.
Third, it provides yet another tool for those charged with improving compliance
within firms and organizations. For example, the Article’s framework will improve
the ability to assess potential conflicts of interest within the compliance process.
Additionally, it will provide regulators with another tool for evaluating compliance
failures. The Article’s framework will also assist compliance actors in pinpointing
systemic compliance failures. Finally, utilizing a process frame may increase notions
of procedural fairness and encourage organizations’ members and employees to
comply with newly implemented policies and procedures.
Compliance failures are often quite complex, but this Article’s proposal allows
complex compliance failures to be assessed in components that are more
manageable. As such, it will hopefully assist in the greater effort to improve
compliance programs at firms and organizations more generally.

